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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CONVERSATION

A. The Guidelines Conversation
Defendant: What am I looking at if I plead guilty?
Counsel: The Guideline range is thirty-three to forty-one
1
months. There are no motions for a lower
sentence in your case. We will argue for the
“low end” of the Guidelines, thirty-three
months, the government will likely ask for the
middle, and the judge will likely impose
something in between.
1. For illustrative purposes, the common federal offense of bank robbery
may result in an applicable Guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one months.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B3.1 (2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009_guidelines/Manual/GL2009.pdf.
This
hypothetical assumes a base offense level of twenty, a two-level sentencing
enhancement for financial institution, and a three-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility for a total offense level of nineteen. Assuming a criminal history
of Category II results in a Guideline range of thirty-three to forty-one months. See
id. § 5.A ( Sentencing Table).
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B. The Post-Booker Conversation
Defendant: What am I looking at if I plead guilty?
Counsel: It is difficult to say. The law that applies to sentencing
in federal court changed dramatically in 2005. The
Guidelines dictated sentencing and required the
court to sentence within a range, here thirty-three to
forty-one months. Now, the judge could sentence
you to anywhere from no jail to the maximum of
2
twenty years.
Defendant: So what changed?
Counsel:
Today, the Guidelines are just “advisory.” The court
must still calculate and start from thirty-three to fortyone months. The court must still consider any
motions to lower that sentence called downward
departures, which don’t apply in your case. The
court then considers some general factors about
sentencing and imposes a sentence that is
“reasonable.”
Defendant: Then the judge will give me something within the
thirty-three to forty-one months?
Counsel:
Before 2005, my answer would have been yes. Today,
it varies depending on several factors: the facts of the
case, your personal history and circumstances, the
goals of sentencing, and even which judge we draw.
The good news is judges are sentencing defendants
to terms below the guideline range in more than
forty percent of cases.
Defendant: That’s good. I might get less than the thirty-three
months then.
Counsel:
Well, maybe but maybe not. That more than forty
percent statistic may be misleading, because it
includes cases when the government files motions for
lower sentences and cases when the defense has a
viable motion for a lower sentence. We don’t have
either in your case.
Further, based on the process the court must go
2. In the same example as supra note 1, the bank robbery carries a statutory
maximum of twenty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). Again, with the factors
outlined above in supra note 1, the offense resulted in an applicable Guideline
range of thirty-three to forty-one months. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note
1, §§ 2B3.1, 5.A.
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through, there are reasons that may cause the judge
to go below the range, within the range, or possibly,
although not likely, above the range.
Defendant: It sounds like I won’t know much, and you can’t
predict much, even if I decide to plead guilty. I
won’t really know anything more about my future
until the day of sentencing.
Counsel:
I’m afraid that is the state of law in federal
sentencing right now.
Defendant: For my own piece of mind, I would plead guilty and
agree to two and half years right now. Can’t you just
ask the prosecutor if she would agree to that?
Prior to the era of the United States Sentencing Guidelines
3
(the Guidelines), federal prosecutors and defendants entered into
plea agreements that included a “specific sentence or sentencing
4
range.” Binding plea agreements served an important function of
5
counterbalancing the vast judicial discretion at sentencing. The
6
federal judiciary enjoyed wide discretion in imposing a sentence;
the government’s and defendant’s freedom to contract for an
appropriate sentence mirrored that discretion.
In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission (the
7
Commission), implemented the Guidelines. Congress mandated
3. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1987) (amended 1989).
The “era” of the mandatory Guidelines is defined as November 1, 1987, the date
the Guidelines became “effective,” to January 12, 2005, the date of the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
5. There are several reported pre-Guidelines, binding plea agreement cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1982). In these reported cases, the defendant thereafter challenged a
portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to the binding plea agreement. It is
important to note that nearly all binding plea agreements present neither an issue
for appeal nor a need for written opinion at the district court level.
6. See Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65,
67–70 (2007) (outlining the historical fluctuations of judicial discretion in federal
sentencing theory). The Court, prior to 1987, sentenced a defendant convicted of
a felony to a term of imprisonment between the statutory minimum (often no jail
time) and maximum for the offense of conviction; thus, prior to the Guidelines,
the court imposed a sentence anywhere from no jail time to twenty years in prison
in the bank robbery. See example in supra text accompanying notes 1–2; see also 18
U.S.C § 2113 (2002).
7. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3.
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that the Guidelines severely limit the court’s discretion at
8
sentencing. Aside from its legislative goals of uniformity and
proportionality, the mandatory federal sentencing scheme
promoted predictability and informed decision making for the
9
defendant.
The mandatory Guidelines effectively replaced
binding plea agreements. Upon indictment, the defendant already
10
faced his likely “specific . . . sentencing range,” as set out in the
Guidelines.
Without a need to do so, the Guidelines then further
marginalized the role of binding plea agreements through policy
11
Binding plea agreements, as a
statements and commentary.
result, became a stigmatized novelty in federal criminal practice.
This valuable tool, as a result, has remained underutilized and
12
unavailable to criminal defendants for more than twenty years.
In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court relegated
the Guidelines to a mere sentencing consideration that is no longer
13
mandatory on federal district judges.
The Court introduced a
14
new process in federal sentencing. The fall of the Guidelines may
15
benefit defendants statistically, yet the new process will never be as
16
After more than twenty years of
predictable and informative.
isolated and inconsistent use, binding plea agreements could again
restore some predictability and informed decision making for the

8. See 18 U.S.C § 3553(b) (2009).
9. See infra Part II.C (discussing predictability and informed decision making
for the defendant as collateral benefits of the mandatory Guidelines).
10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (allowing the parties in a criminal case to
negotiate a “sentencing range” before the Commission usurped that phrase in the
Guidelines).
11. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.2, cmt. background
(defining the standard for judicial acceptance of a binding plea agreement and
over-defining the “justifiable reasons” the court may rely upon); see also infra Part
III.B (discussing binding plea agreements as meaningless under the Guidelines).
12. See infra Part III.A–B (arguing that the mandatory Guidelines effectively
replaced binding agreements and, through Guidelines’ policy statements,
rendered these agreements meaningless for more than twenty years).
13. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
14. Id. at 245–46 (setting out the new process of federal sentencing with
“advisory guidelines”).
15. See infra Part IV.C.2 and note 222 (discussing the favorable statistics for
the defendant at sentencing post-Booker). In 2009, district court judges imposed
sentences below the applicable Guidelines range in more than forty-three percent
of federal criminal cases and the average variance from the Guideline range in
these cases has increased as well. See infra Part IV.C.2 and note 222.
16. See infra Part II.C (discussing predictability and informed decision making
as collateral benefits of the mandatory Guidelines for the individual defendant).
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17

defendant.
We do not have to be resigned to the above conversation as the
post-Booker norm. This article argues that in addition to the swing
toward increased judicial discretion and overall lower sentences,
the pendulum also can swing toward predictability and informed
decision making for the defendant. The federal sentencing
scheme must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate, and contract
for what the defendant believes is a uniform, proportional, and fair
18
sentence. Increased use of binding plea agreements in federal
court could complement the progressive developments following
Booker and restore some predictability and informed decision
19
making to federal sentencing. However, without significant rule,
policy, and perception changes, like those proposed in Part VI of
this article, binding plea agreements will continue to be disfavored
20
by some district courts, carry an unwarranted stigma among
21
prosecutors, and remain underutilized and largely unavailable to
17. See infra Part V (discussing a renewed role for binding plea agreements
post-Booker); infra Part VI (proposing rule, policy, and perception changes to
encourage binding plea agreements in federal criminal practice and restore some
predictability and informed decision making for the defendant).
18. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (setting out some specific terms that may appear
in federal plea agreements, including “specific sentences” and applicability of
Guidelines’ provisions); see generally Michael D. Cicchini, Broken Government
Promises: A Contract-Based Approach To Enforcing Plea Bargains, 38 N.M. L. REV. 159
(2008) (discussing that a solution to the problem would be to apply contract law
principles consistently and fairly in enforcing plea agreements); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
19. See infra Part V (proposing a renewed role for binding plea agreements
post-Booker).
20. See, e.g., United States v Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Wis. 1980)
(“At the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a [binding] plea
agreement. It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of sentence that
should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or she has been
adjudged guilty.”); cf. United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d. 844, 845 (D. Neb.
2005) (“When such a plea agreement smells too much like cow manure siphoned
from a feedlot after a swampy, summer rain, judges should not pretend the odor is
lilac. On the other hand, if the plea agreement stinks, but the stench is more like
kitty litter than cow manure, a judge should hold his or her nose and move on.
The trick is to discern the difference.”); see infra note 241 and accompanying text
(demonstrating how district court judges may continue to disfavor binding plea
agreements after the Supreme Court restored their discretion in Booker). In Coney,
the district court judge ultimately accepted a binding plea agreement calling for a
sentence below the Guidelines. See Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 850 (finding
“justifiable reasons” to accept the binding plea agreement).
21. See infra notes 88–92 and 237–39 (discussing Department of Justice
protocol that discouraged the type of discounted binding plea agreements
Congress intended when it enacted FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C)).
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criminal defendants.
Part II of this article presents a brief historical background of
federal sentencing and the policy goals behind the Guidelines’
implementation. Part III discusses the binding plea agreement
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This
Part also explains how the mandatory Guidelines effectively
replaced the binding plea agreement and how the Commission and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have marginalized the use of this
valuable tool for more than twenty years. Part IV summarizes the
constitutional challenge to judicial findings of sentencing
enhancements that was ultimately struck down in Booker, as well as
the disconnect between the constitutional challenge and the
Court’s ultimate remedy of rendering the Guidelines “advisory.”
This Part also discusses the current state of federal sentencing
practice post-Booker in terms of renewed judicial discretion, the
benefit to defendants, and liberated prosecutors.
Part V proposes that binding plea agreements should again
become an integral part of federal practice. Last, Part VI proposes
rule, policy, and perception changes that can assist in establishing a
renewed role for binding plea agreements in federal criminal
practice. These include proposed revisions to Rule 11 and the
Guidelines’ treatment of binding plea agreements, a proposed
model local rule, and sample plea agreement language, each
designed to encourage the use of binding plea agreements after
Booker. These changes are designed to promote predictability and
informed decision making at sentencing.
II.

FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY AND THE EVOLVING
LANDSCAPE

Keeping current with the changes in federal sentencing has
22
The
been a challenging proposition since the late 1990s.
evolution from pre-Guidelines to post-Guidelines federal
23
sentencing can be described as “coming full circle.” Yet, for the
22. See also infra Part II.D.2 (discussing how the Guidelines amplified episodes
of prosecutorial discretion); Part III.B and note 90 (discussing sub rosa
understandings in binding plea agreements); see also John Gleeson, The Sentencing
Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Role of the Courts in Policing Sentence
Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 648–50 & n.38–44 (2008) (discussing binding
plea agreements that were sent underground by the mandatory Guidelines).
23. See Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion
Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 615, 650 (2006) (discussing Booker’s
almost twenty-year impact on federal sentencing); see also Douglas A. Berman,
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individual defendant, the post-Booker state of federal sentencing is
24
lacking in consistency and predictability. The seismic changes in
Booker were progressive and positive developments. For purposes of
this article, it is assumed that federal sentencing is more
sophisticated, well-reasoned, and fair today than it was before the
mandatory Guidelines.
A. Before the Mandatory Guidelines
Prior to 1987, federal district court judges imposed criminal
sentences based on their own notions of fairness, compassion, and
25
justice.
Because each judge was left to apply his or her own
Reasoning Through Reasonableness, 115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 142, 142 (2006)
(“Booker and § 3553(a) thus demand that federal sentencing judges exercise
reasoned judgment by filtering the Guidelines’ advice through the provisions of §
3553(a); by doing so, district judges avoid giving any particular judge-found fact a
‘determinate’ role in calculating the sentence, and thereby avoid the
constitutional problem identified in Booker.”); Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More
Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Understandings of Reasonableness
Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 118 (2008) (outlining the transition from
sentencing in the discretion of the judges pre-Guidelines to sentencing under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines).
24. See David C. Holman, Death by a Thousand Cases: After Booker, Rita, and
Gall, the Guidelines Still Violate the Sixth Amendment, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 288
(2008) (“Because the presumption is a ‘nonbinding appellate presumption,’ the
sentencing judge is not required to impose a Guidelines sentence. The Court
assumed that the district court judge may freely assign any sentence between the
statutory minimum and maximum. If that is the case, then judge-found facts and
the advisory Guidelines range are mere factors among many that judges may use
to select a sentence. A judge could find facts that would triple a Guidelines
sentence, but still permissibly sentence the defendant well below the Guidelines
range. The constitutionality of the presumption of reasonableness completely
depends on the truly advisory nature of the Guidelines.”); Jefferson Exum, supra
note 23, at 124 (“Researchers have explained that ‘[t]o the extent that judges use
different judgmental anchors to make their sentencing decisions, the resulting
sentences are likely to differ.’” (citing Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler,
Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1535, 1537 (2001))).
25. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 31, 38 (1983); see also Brief for the United States
Sentencing Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Claiborne v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (No. 06-5754), 2007 WL 173622, at *1 (“Before
the Act, ‘each judge [was] left to apply his own notions of the purposes of
sentencing. As a result, . . . Federal judges mete[d] out [a] . . . wide range of
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38)
(alterations in original)); Christine DeMaso, Advisory Sentencing and the
Federalization of Crime: Should Federal Sentencing Judges Consider the Disparity Between
State and Federal Sentences Under Booker?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2099 (2006)
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notions of the purpose of sentencing, the federal sentencing system
exhibited “an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders . . .
26
convicted of similar crimes.” Courts even differed about which
considerations to apply at sentencing. Before the mandatory
Guidelines, where charges were brought and which judge would
preside were as important to the criminally accused as what charges
27
were brought.
Federal sentencing lacked clear policy statements and
considerations to guide lifetime-appointed judges when evaluating
individual defendants and their offense conduct. Congress grew
28
concerned with unfettered judicial discretion at sentencing. The
dangers of a sentencing scheme overly reliant on judicial discretion
and without articulated goals were expressed in terms of
29
“unwarranted sentencing disparity” and the need for “uniformity.”
Further, the larger public policy discussions about the utility and
effect of punishment and the criminal justice system’s role in
serving those goals gained momentum during the 1970s and early
30
1980s. Congress reacted to a negative public perception of the

(discussing how pre-Guidelines “judges had nearly absolute and unreviewable
sentencing discretion”).
26. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 31, 38. Senator Ted Kennedy argued that
sentencing guidelines were necessary because “[f]ederal criminal sentencing is a
national disgrace. Under current sentencing procedures, judges mete out an
unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders convicted of similar crimes.”
130 CONG. REC. 1644 (1984).
27. See generally James M. Anderson, Jeffrey R. Kling & Kate Stith, Measuring
Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L.
& ECON. 271 (1999).
28. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38; see also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
364 (1989) (“Congress delegated almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing
judge to determine” a convicted defendant’s sentence, but a review of the
legislative history strongly suggests that the sentencing disparity that Congress
hoped to eliminate did not stem from prosecutorial discretion, but instead from
unchecked judicial discretion in formulating sentences.); United States v.
LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1400 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Three principal forces propelled the
legislation: Congress sought to establish truth in sentencing by eliminating parole,
to guarantee uniformity in sentencing for similarly situated defendants, and to
ensure that the punishment fit the crime.”), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 751
(1997).
29. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 135398 Stat.
1837 (1987), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38–59
(collectively S. REP. NO. 98-225).
30. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL:
PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 24–43 (1974).
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31

federal system’s lack of a sentencing scheme.
These influences eventually compelled Congress to draft
32
legislation and overhaul federal sentencing. Congress passed the
most comprehensive federal sentencing legislation in history, the
33
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), and therein created the
34
Commission.
As part of the SRA, Congress introduced into
federal criminal jurisprudence statutes setting forth “factors to be
35
considered” at sentencing and other issues related to sentencing.
The Commission was charged with fundamentally changing
federal sentencing and the wide disparity of results throughout the
36
federal system. The Commission also published policy statements,
additional sentencing considerations, and commentary.
The
culmination of the Commission’s work was implemented as the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987.
The Guidelines
37
incorporated and expanded the statutory sentencing factors and,
in turn, a corresponding statute made the Guidelines mandatory in
38
Congress expressly tasked the Commission with
federal court.
collecting federal sentencing data. The Commission’s ongoing
39
function was to assess and adjust the Guidelines accordingly. The
40
Commission did, and still does, just that.
31. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 39.
34. See id.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2009).
36. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39.
37. The Guidelines are “the expert attempt” of the Commission to “weigh
[the § 3553(a) sentencing] factors in a variety of situations.” United States v.
Terrell, 445 F.3d 1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2006).
38. Prior to Booker, federal criminal practitioners and district court judges
paid little attention to the “factors to be considered at sentencing” in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a). This supports the premise that policy statements and “goals” would likely
be ignored if they are not mandatory. Today, practitioners and judges recite and
apply the factors in § 3553(a) because appellate courts have remanded and held
that sentences are procedurally unreasonable if the factors were not considered on
the record. See infra note 222 (outlining the procedural and substantive
components of the “reasonableness” review on appeal).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2010). The Commission continues to collect data
and draft modifications to the Guidelines. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra
note 1, § 5H1.11 (stating the recently added sentencing considerations for
military, civic, charitable, or public service); Notice of Final Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg.
46478, 46479 (Sept. 9, 2009) (stating the policy priorities identified in response to
public comment on proposed priorities).
40. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“In addition
to the duty the Commission has to promulgate determinative-sentence guidelines,
it is under an obligation periodically to ‘review and revise’ the guidelines.”
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Congress did not envision, nor did the Commission set out to
develop, the most complicated mathematical word problem known
41
anywhere in criminal law. Yet, once the Commission embarked
upon the enormous task of reducing federal convictions into a
42
The
complex matrix calculation, the result was inevitable.
Commission, with some foresight and flexibility, designed its work
to develop based upon appellate court interpretation and further
43
legislative action.
The Commission’s mandate and continued
functions are designed to promote the goals of uniformity and
44
proportionality at sentencing.
B. Uniformity and Proportionality Under the Mandatory Guidelines
The federal criminal justice system needed a new sentencing
45
46
The
scheme to promote uniformity and proportionality.
(quoting 28 U.S.C. 994(o) (1988))).
41. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an
Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571, 584 (1992). “In the end, the
Commission had to balance the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple
categorization with detailed, complex subcategorization and devise a system that
could most effectively meet the statutory goals of sentencing reform.” Id. at 575.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1346 (6th Cir. 1990)
(Ryan, J., concurring) (discussing the “complex matrix of presumptions, rules,
regulations, and arithmetical formulae that comprise the sentencing guidelines”).
43. See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (“The spirit of
compromise that permeates the Guidelines arose out of the practical needs of
administration, institutional considerations, and the competing goals of a criminal
justices system . . . .”).
44. See JACK M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10 (1980); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent
of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 785 (2006) (“Rising
departure rates [from the Commission’s mandates] can thus fairly be
characterized as an indication that many judges lack a strong commitment to the
guidelines’ vision of uniformity.”); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role
of Sentencing Guidelines Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 63, 70 (1993) (“[T]he SRA seeks to reconcile competing goals
of proportionality and uniformity.”).
45. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
1336, 1336 (2004) (“[R]educing sentencing disparity . . . requires a coherent
underlying theory of punishment, because disparity is not a self-defining
concept.”); O’Hear, supra note 44, at 750 (“[U]niformity seeks to eliminate
unwarranted sentencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities.
The problem lies in distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted.”); Julie
R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1342, 1352–62 (1997) (defending the Guidelines while
describing Congress’s goals).
46. See 28 U.S.C § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note
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Commission implemented the Guidelines to include definitive
provisions and policy statements aimed at these goals. The policy
statements and commentary aim to promote uniformity and
47
proportionality in the federal system.
A uniform sentencing
48
system promotes honesty, fairness, and justice.
Congress, at the same time, promulgated a statute that made
49
the Guidelines binding on federal judges. The mandatory nature
of the Guidelines further supported the goals of uniformity and
50
proportionality.
The mandatory Guidelines also leveled the
disparity among jurisdictions and individual judges and curbed
51
forum shopping and prosecutorial gamesmanship.

1, § 1A1.3 (Congress set out three goals in the preamble to the Guidelines: (1)
“honesty in sentencing”; (2) “uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar
offenders”; and (3) “proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.”); see
also infra Part V.A (discussing how the Supreme Court, in formulating the
“reasonableness” standard of review, has centered on uniformity, as opposed to
predictability and informed decision making for the individual defendant).
47. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a)(2), 995(a)(1) (2010) (requiring the Commission
to issue “general policy statements” regarding the application of the guidelines
and to “establish general policies . . . as are necessary to carry out the purposes” of
the legislation).
48. See 28 U.S.C § 991(b)(1)(B) (2010) (stating that the purposes of the
United States Sentencing Commission are to “provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing”); Marc L. Miller, Domination & Dissatisfaction:
Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1217 (2004) (citing “honesty” as a
goal in the federal sentencing scheme).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2010).
50. Multiple sections of the Guidelines Manual outline mandatory minimum
sentences. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, §§ 2A3.6, 2B1.5, 2D21; see
also O’Hear, supra note 44, at 785 (“Still, while prosecutors may encourage or
acquiesce, the decision to depart ultimately lies with the judge. Rising departure
rates can thus fairly be characterized as an indication that many judges lack a
strong commitment to the guidelines’ vision of uniformity.”) (citing Miller, supra
note 48, at 1237–38).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1976)
(noting the prosecution’s deliberate attempt at gaining a tactical advantage
through forum shopping); see generally Steve Y. Koh, Reestablishing the Federal Judge’s
Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE L.J. 1109, 1120–21 (1992) (discussing the prosecutorial
gamesmanship inherent in gathering information for the court’s consideration at
sentencing and in U.S. Probation’s presentencing reports).
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The Commission crafted well-defined categories of offensive
52
conduct, enhancements, and reductions combined with narrowly
53
constructed grounds for departure. Similarly situated defendants,
those who committed similar offenses with similar characteristics
and having similar criminal histories were treated uniformly, or as
54
55
consistently as possible, throughout the country. Amendments
52. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, §§
217(a), 235(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2020, 2032 (1984); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 1, chs. 2–3 (defining the many offense conduct and reduction
calculations in the Guidelines).
53. The Guidelines define its created terminology, including offense level,
reduction, enhancement, and departure. The court’s narrow departure authority
was set out in U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5K2.0 (Grounds for
Departure); see also id. § 5H1.4 (Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol
Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addiction), § 5H1.6 (Family Ties and
Responsibilities), § 5H1.7 (Role in the Offense), § 5H1.8 (Criminal History), §
5K2.10 (Victim’s Conduct), § 5K2.12 (Coercion and Duress), § 5K2.13
(Diminished Capacity), § 5K2.20 (Aberrant Behavior). Prior to Booker, if the court
departed from the guideline range, an appellate court could review the
“reasonableness” of the departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2010).
54. The United States Attorney’s Manual describes how the “United States
Attorney, within his/her district, has plenary authority with regard to federal
criminal matters.” See U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL §§ 9–2.001 (1997) [hereinafter ATTORNEY’S MANUAL],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam
/index.html. This plenary authority creates legitimate, yet tangible, differences
and the justified disparity in legitimate prosecutorial practices, or even a disparity
in sentences resulting from prosecutorial practices, is rarely, if ever, a proper basis
for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines range. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 1, § 1B1.1.
The U.S. Attorney and his or her delegates, through local rules and
practices and “internal policy,” create different standards for declinations, see
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL at § 9-2.020, charging thresholds or otherwise authorizing
prosecution, id. § 9-2.030, post-indictment charging by information and dismissal
of indictments, id. § 9-2.050, acceptance of responsibility reductions, id. § 3B1.1,
filing substantial assistance downward departure motions and valuing downward
departure motions, id. § 5K1.1, and filing special informations related to statutory
enhancements, see 21 U.S.C. § 851 (1970) (requiring filing of special information
related to prior convictions); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 761–62
(1997) (describing a prosecutor’s discretion to “determine whether a particular
defendant will be subject to the enhanced statutory maximum, . . .” [such as an
851 enhancement, which is] “similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises when
he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect”); ATTORNEY’S
MANUAL, supra, § 9-27.450 (requiring a formal “approval system” but deferring to
the U.S. Attorney to establish the parameters of the system).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2010) (incorporating uniformity into the
“factors to be considered” at sentencing); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Duty to
Avoid Disparity: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 627, 629 (2006) (“In the post-Booker world, the most common use of [18
U.S.C. § 3553](a)(6) has perhaps been as a basis for reducing or eliminating the
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to the Guidelines, appellate decisions, and sentencing proceedings
interpreting the Guidelines discussed specific case facts and
56
offender characteristics in terms of these goals.
In practice,
however, the mandatory Guidelines were not without loopholes
57
that undercut true uniformity.
C. Predictability and Informed Decision Making
Predictability and informed decision making served as oftoverlooked collateral benefits of the mandatory federal sentencing
58
scheme. The Supreme Court has discussed federal sentencing in
59
terms of its predictability during the mandatory Guidelines era.
The Guidelines were inflexible, draconian, and skewed toward
harsher punishments; yet, they were predictable as to the outcome
and, for better or worse, provided valuable information to the
defendant early in a criminal case. The predictability and
information inherent to the Guidelines led to more informed
decisions about guilty pleas, meaningful cooperation, and the risk
differences in sentences that would otherwise be imposed on co-defendants
pursuant to the Guidelines.”); DeMaso, supra note 25 (noting that prior to the
Guidelines, “judges had nearly absolute and unreviewable sentencing discretion”).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 467–68 (9th Cir. 1991)
(denying the defendant’s motion for downward departure based upon
proportionality with co-defendants and holding that “[b]asic notions of fairness
dictate that defendants should be sentenced in proportion to their crimes . . . .
[Yet, a] downward departure to correct sentencing disparity brings a defendant’s
sentence more into line with his or her codefendant’s sentence, but places it out
of line with sentences imposed on all similar offenders in other cases”).
57. See infra Part II.D (discussing the loopholes and lack of uniformity in the
federal sentencing system under the Guidelines and in matters left to
prosecutorial discretion). See generally Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28
SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1604611 (exploring the “localized meaning” of
provisions in the Guidelines, such as departures for “substantial assistance” to law
enforcement and reductions for “acceptance of responsibility”).
58. See Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Comment, Constitutional Law: Predictability as
Fairness and the Possible Return to Federal Indeterminate Sentencing, 57 FLA. L. REV. 999,
1006–10 (2005) (analyzing Booker and noting that the decision allows defendants
to better “predict the term of incarceration that they face at the commencement
of the criminal proceeding”).
59. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (stating that the
pre-Guidelines system of indeterminate sentencing lacked “uniformity,
predictability, and a degree of detachment”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 366 (1989) (discussing how the pre-Guidelines federal sentencing scheme led
to “widespread dissatisfaction with the uncertainties” regarding federal
sentencing).
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60

associated with trial.
The Guidelines also permitted the
defendant to be involved in deciding his or her own fate.
The mandatory Guidelines empowered defendants with more
pointed advice from counsel and, accordingly, more informed
decision making.
A defendant pleading guilty during the
mandatory Guidelines era had a firm understanding about what lie
ahead at sentencing. The individual defendant valued the benefits
of predictability and informed decision making as much as, if not
more than, Congress’s and the Commission’s goals of uniformity
and proportionality.
The loss of benefits like predictability and the defendant’s
information at sentencing may be an ancillary cost of the
progressive developments in federal sentencing. Some might opt
for overall lower sentences instead of generalized notions of
predictability and informed decision making. The argument begs
the question: can judicial discretion and a more individualized
federal sentencing scheme coexist with the defendant’s need for
predictability and informed decision making at sentencing? As
argued in this article, through the use of binding plea agreements,
61
the answer is yes.
D. “One Size Fits All” Did Not Fit
The mandatory Guidelines had an adverse impact on all
62
involved in a federal sentencing proceeding. The district court
60. In the federal criminal system, sentencing and cooperation are
intertwined throughout the procession of a case. See ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra
note 54, § 9-27.230 (listing general guidelines for federal prosecution and
declination of prosecution, including the person’s willingness to cooperate in the
investigation or prosecution of others and the probable sentence or other
consequences if the person is convicted); see also George C. Harris, Testimony for
Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 9, 13 (2000)
(equating “cooperation agreements” to government bribery).
61. See infra Part V (discussing the renewed role for binding plea agreements
to restore the predictability and informed decision making lost after Booker).
62. The Guidelines significantly curtailed judicial discretion at sentencing.
The sentencing court exercised its discretion within a range of six or twelve
months in most cases, as compared to a span of ten-to-twenty years established by
statute. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1. The Guidelines similarly
impacted prosecutorial discretion in most matters related to sentencing. After the
decisions related to charging and potential cooperation, the federal prosecutor
played a minimal role in the sentencing of most defendants. Id. Most
importantly, the Guidelines prescribed an outcome for the individual defendant
based upon his offense conduct and criminal history, and with less attention to his
individual circumstances. See supra note 53 (listing some of the individual
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judge, prosecutor, and individual defendant each had their role
63
significantly limited by the mandatory Guidelines. A “one size fits
all” approach unfairly simplified and categorized the difficult task
64
of sentencing individual defendants. The Guidelines dictated the
process and hamstrung the parties for almost twenty years while
65
mandatory and, to some degree, still do so today.
With a limited role in the “plea and sentence” federal system,
the balance of the district court’s impressions, compassion, or ire
about a case or an individual defendant were pigeon-holed into its
66
“discretion” to sentence within a relatively small range of options.
The Guidelines severely usurped most post-indictment situations
67
reserved for prosecutorial discretion, and, in turn, abuses of
considerations that did not warrant a downward departure).
63. See supra Part I. The defendant’s role at sentencing is not that far
removed from “the Guidelines conversation.” See supra Part I.A. The defendant’s
conduct and criminal history produced a numerical range and the vast majority of
imposed sentences followed that mathematical guidance. Id.
64. Compare United States v. Rausch, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (D. Colo.
2008) (“The criteria also point to individuated considerations: No one size fits all.
The object of this balancing process is to achieve not a perfect or a mechanical
sentence, but a condign one-one that is decent, appropriate and deserved under
all attendant circumstances.”) (emphasis added), with United States v. Quigley, 30
F.3d 135 (Table), Nos. 93-1429, 93-1520, 1994 WL 399569, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 1,
1994) (describing how the defendant, “who had no criminal history, [was]
unfortunate enough to have committed a crime that lump[ed] him together with
more dangerous and hardened criminals, [making him] suffer the consequences
of one-size-fits-all sentencing”). Courts often discussed “one-size-fits-all” when
considering downward departures under Guidelines section 5K2.0, “Grounds for
Departure,” because the Guidelines provision was too sweeping in the case at
issue. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez-Gallegos, 217 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (10th
Cir. 2000) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5K2.0) (“Where the
factor in issue is one already taken into account by the applicable Guideline and
adjustments, departure from the Guideline is permissible only if that factor is
present in a manner or degree unusual enough to distinguish the case from the
‘heartland’ of cases covered by the Guideline.”).
65. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1. The Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, provided for the
development of modern guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3553 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 1, pt. A,
subpt. 1. The Act delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and
rationalize the federal sentencing process. Id.
66. The range of an applicable Guidelines sentence for Zone D, which
addresses the most serious offenses, spans from twenty to thirty-three percent of
the high end of the guideline range. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5,
pt. A. However, the percentage is only a fraction of the range between the
statutory minimum and maximum. See id.
67. See Koh, supra note 51, at 1120–21 (1992) (discussing a gamesmanship in
gathering information for the court’s consideration at sentencing proceedings
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prosecutorial discretion undermined the sentencing goals of
68
uniformity and proportionality. The federal sentencing scheme
69
was condemned as overly formulaic, inflexible, and harsh.
A
change to the mandatory Guidelines may have been unavoidable.
1. Limited Judicial Role in the “Plea and Sentence” Federal System
The district court’s limited role in most criminal cases bears on
two issues applicable to this article. First, the limited role explains
why some judges may abhor policies or practices that rein in their
discretion, such as mandatory sentencing schemes and binding
70
plea agreements.
Second, because judges are prohibited by
statute from having a role in plea negotiations, the parties
undertake a bit of a mystery in pursuing a binding plea agreement
that must be accepted by the court without knowing the court’s
standard for acceptance or personal feelings about determinative
71
agreements. The limited judicial role also may best explain why
72
the Court rendered the Guidelines advisory in Booker.
Federal district court judges have long presided over a
predominantly criminal docket, wherein ninety-five percent of the
73
cases are resolved by guilty plea.
After the Supreme Court’s
and in pre-sentencing reports); Notes, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for
Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 837 (1968) (discussing how the information before
the court at sentencing comes almost exclusively from prosecutors, “who cannot
be expected to be disinterested”).
68. E.g., United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting
that because judges are prevented from departing from the Guidelines, discretion
is transferred to prosecutors); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d
Cir. 1990) (Rosenn, J., concurring) (discussing how the Guidelines allow for
prosecutors’ “manipulation of . . . charge and sentencing”).
69. See Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58
STAN. L. REV. 37, 46 (2005) (criticizing sentencing schemes like the Guidelines
that guide judges to impose sentences “calculated by means of mechanical scoring
systems . . . rather than by looking closely at the circumstances of individual
cases”).
70. See Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L.
REV. 407, 460–61 (2008).
71. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
72. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 245 (2005).
73. See 2005 ANN. REP. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.D-4, at 245 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/AnnualReport/2005.pdf
(reporting 77,339 convictions, with 74,024 resulting from guilty pleas). “Although
reliable statistical information is limited, one recent estimate indicated that guilty pleas
account for the disposition of as many as 95% of all criminal cases.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11
Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974. “The great majority of all defendants against whom
indictments or informations are filed in the federal courts plead guilty. Only a
comparatively small number go to trial.” Id. at Advisory Comm. Notes, 1966.
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74

decision in Santabello, the government and the defense were
encouraged to openly negotiate and contract for mutually
75
favorable terms at the time of a guilty plea.
Although federal
criminal practice was a “plea and sentence” system, district court
judges participated in plea discussions and enjoyed true discretion
at sentencing.
76
In the 1970s, Congress, after some debate, decided that in
federal court, unlike prior practice and most state court systems,
77
the judge would have no role in plea discussions. Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 (Rule 11) covered the parameters of a
guilty plea colloquy with the defendant and clearly delineated the
78
court’s limited role in plea negotiations. Congress provided that
74. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
75. See id. at 261–62 (“The plea must, of course, be voluntary and knowing
and if it was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way
be made known.”).
76. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974 (“It has been stated
that it is common practice for a judge to participate in plea discussions.”) (citing
D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 32–52, 78–104 (1966)); Dominick R. Vetri, Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining:
Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 891, 905
(1964); cf. ABA COMM. ON PROF’L ETHICS, INFORMAL OP. C-779 (1965) (“The judge,
of course, should not be a party to any arrangements in advance for the
determination of sentence whether as a result of a guilty plea or a finding of guilty
based on proof.”).
77. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974 (citing ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3(a) (Approved Draft 1968))
(introducing subdivision (e)(1) prohibiting the court from participating in plea
discussions); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding
that trial judges should neither participate in plea bargaining nor entice
defendants to plead guilty with promises of a lenient sentence). But see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11 Advisory Comm. Notes, 2002 (citing United States v. Torres, 999 F.2d
376, 378 (9th Cir. 1993)) (noting the practice and concluding that the presiding
judge had not participated in a plea agreement that had resulted from discussions
involving another judge and stating that “[t]he Committee considered whether to
address the practice in some courts of using judges to facilitate plea agreements.”).
78. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“The court must not participate in these
discussions.”); see also Virgin Islands v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 376 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Longval v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1981)) (stating that “[a]
judge who participates in plea bargaining ‘is no longer a judicial officer or a
neutral arbiter. Rather, he becomes or seems to become an advocate for the
resolution he has suggested to the defendant.”); United States ex rel. Elksnis v.
Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (discussing the “unequal positions
of the judge and the accused”). But see Colin Miller, Anchors Away: Why the
Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges Should Be Able To Participate in Plea Discussions 3
(John Marshall Law School, working paper series, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672442
(arguing
that
judicial participation in plea discussions would produce more reasonable plea
agreements than those that begin with unnecessarily high initial offers from the
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the court must accept or reject guilty pleas and negotiated plea
agreements; yet, due to the imbalance of a lifetime-appointed
federal judge relative to a criminal defendant, the court shall not
79
be part of the discussion. Presiding over fewer criminal trials and
disinvited from plea discussions, the district court served its most
80
important function at sentencing.
Following the introduction of the Guidelines, federal court
remained a plea and sentence practice. District court judges still
81
had no role in plea discussions.
The mandatory Guidelines
reduced sentencing to a ceremony and severely limited the court’s
role in the phase in which it was most involved. Specific provisions
82
of the Guidelines and the mandatory scheme’s predictability
83
Yet the central functions of
further incentivized guilty pleas.
federal sentencing were outsourced to the Commission for creating
84
the Guidelines and to the U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services for
85
running the initial calculations.

government).
79. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
80. Many district courts delegate the ministerial duties of handling guilty
pleas in federal courts. Some still argue the need for a judicial role in plea
bargaining. See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and
Sentence Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023, 2028–29 (2006) (coining most plea
bargaining as “biased and coercive”). It was the potential for judicial coercion that
led Congress to carve the court out from its function in federal plea bargaining.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, Advisory Comm. Notes, 1974.
81. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
82. The Guidelines codified a preexisting principle in federal criminal
practice: if a defendant pleaded guilty and spared the time and resources of a trial,
then the system would treat him more favorable at sentencing. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 3E1.1 (rewarding the defendant who “clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense” and further rewarding
the defendant who “has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of
his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea
of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently”).
83. “According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 94.1% of federal
prosecutors’ cases resolved in 2009 ended with a conviction.” Feds’ Conviction Rate
Bad Sign For Blago, WLS-TV, Aug. 4, 2010, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story
?section=news/local&id=7593302 (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2009).
85. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 995(a)(9), 995(a)(18) (2009) (directing the Commission
to “monitor the performance of probation officers’” work with the Guidelines and
to “devise and conduct periodic training programs of instruction in sentencing
techniques for judicial and probation personnel” and others).
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2. Prosecutorial Discretion
The mandatory Guidelines caused several problems related to
prosecutorial discretion.
First, the mandatory Guidelines
significantly limited the federal prosecutor’s discretion at
86
sentencing. Second, the Guidelines could not address the lack of
uniformity in the few decisions that remained within the discretion
87
Lastly, the mandatory sentencing scheme
of the prosecutor.
88
exacerbated abuses of prosecutorial discretion and, in turn,
government discretion sometimes undermined the sentencing
89
goals of uniformity and proportionality.
90
The mandatory Guidelines, along with DOJ protocol, limited
86. After indictment and plea or trial, the federal prosecutor is confined to
the same narrow Guidelines range based upon the offense conduct charged and
the criminal history of the defendant. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John
Ashcroft on Dep’t Policy and Procedures Concerning Sentencing
Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals to All Federal Prosecutors (July 28,
2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft July 2003 Memo], available at http://www.nacdl.org
/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03_32/$FILE/AG_Guidance_Stcg_Recs.pdf (requiring
prosecutors to recommend a sentence to the court within the Guidelines and to
oppose all motions for downward departure filed by the defendant or by the court
sua sponte).
87. See Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law:
Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1 (2009) (discussing
prosecutorial discretion as the central component in federal criminal practice, yet
not subject to judicial review); cf. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 639 (advocating for
binding plea agreement determinations to be matters within prosecutorial
discretion).
88. The Guidelines treated all offense conduct mathematically, even if the
charges arose from abuses of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., United States v.
Wilson, 262 F.3d 305, 314 (4th Cir. 2001) (considering vindictive prosecution
claims occurring after the defendant exercises his right to appeal).
89. See infra notes 102, 106 (describing instances when prosecutorial
discretion served to negotiate the guidelines, as opposed to operate within them).
90. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86 (setting out the policies and
procedures for sentencing recommendations, hearings, and appeals);
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. James Comey on Dep’t Policies and Procedures
Concerning Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (Jan. 28, 2005) [hereinafter
Comey 2005 Memo], available at http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/~/media
/Files/Comey%20Memo%202005.ashx
(echoing
similar
guidance);
cf.
Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder on Dep’t Policy on Charging and
Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010) [hereinafter Holder 2010
Memo], available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/holdermemo.pdf
(discussing rare cases in which sentences outside of the Guidelines may be
appropriate); see also the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117
Stat. 650, 675 (2003) (directing the Sentencing Commission to review the grounds
for downward departure); Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft on
Dep’t Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and
Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft
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traditional prosecutorial discretion at sentencing. Once the wheels
of justice were set in motion upon charging, the defendant’s fate
91
did not rest with the prosecutor.
The Guidelines produced a
narrow sentencing range and, like the judiciary, the prosecutor’s
discretion was similarly confined. The DOJ required that federal
prosecutors mechanically argue for “guideline sentences” and
defend against all other attempts by the defense or the judiciary to
92
deviate.
The DOJ sought to regulate decisions that traditionally rested
93
in the discretion of the prosecutor. In 2003, Attorney General
John Ashcroft distributed a memorandum that standardized some
prosecutorial discretion by requiring the government to argue for
94
“guideline sentences.”
The memorandum also required the
95
government to oppose all defense motions for lower sentences
and report when district court judges imposed sentences below the

September
2003
Memo],
available
at
http://www.crimelynx.com
/ashchargememo.html (directing, in a section entitled “Sentence Bargaining,”
that “[t]here are only two types of permissible sentence bargains. . . . Sentences
within the Sentencing Guidelines range . . . [and]
Departures”). Attorney
General Ashcroft stated, in the September 2003 Memo, “Congress has made clear
its view that there have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines, and it has instructed the Commission to take measures ‘to ensure that
the incidence of downward departures [is] substantially reduced.’” Ashcroft
September 2003 Memo.
91.
See infra Part IV.C (discussing how the constitutional holding in Booker
could have given greater discretion to the federal prosecutor, as opposed to the
district court); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (discussing how
the prosecutor through plea negotiations could determine which factors would be
before the district court at sentencing); cf. O’Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1414–17
(defending the Guidelines’ structure as unlikely to allow abuse of prosecutorial
discretion to adversely affect its goals of uniformity and proportionality).
92.
See infra notes 93–95 (describing how DOJ and then Attorney General
John Ashcroft restricted discretion and called for standardized responses to
defense and judicial activity in opposition).
93.
See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86 (telling all Department
attorneys they must adhere to the Department’s policies and procedures for
sentencing recommendations, hearings, and appeals); Comey 2005 Memo, supra
note 90, at 1 (stating “we must take all steps necessary to ensure adherence to the
Sentencing Guidelines”); Holder 2010 Memo, supra note 90, at 1.
94.
See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 2 (“Any sentencing
recommendation made by the United States in a particular case must honestly
reflect the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct and must be fully
consistent with the Guidelines and applicable statutes and with the readily
provable facts about the defendant’s history and conduct.”).
95.
See id. at 3; see also the PROTECT ACT, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. at 675
(aiming at reducing the prevalence of downward departures from the Guidelines).
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96

guideline range. The Department’s message was clear: the fewer
incidents of prosecutorial discretion, and the greater deference to
the Guidelines, the better.
Partly because of the mandatory Guidelines, the government
sometimes resorted to loopholes in the Guidelines to resolve cases.
For example, some prosecutors treated statutory enhancements
97
improperly as matters within their discretion. Federal prosecutors
did not react uniformly in striking pre-indictment arrangements
with defendants and witnesses, or when filing restated charges in
98
conjunction with a plea agreement.
U.S. Attorney’s offices
throughout the country had very different standards when
declining criminal prosecutions, deciding plea agreements,
deciding whether to file a motion for downward departure for
“substantial assistance” and, once filed, recommending a
99
sentencing reduction to the court.
When mandatory, the
Guidelines invited impropriety and disparate treatment in these
100
areas.

96.
See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 3–4 (encouraging the
opposition of defense motions for downward departure and government appeals
of adverse decisions); ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 54, at 9-2:170(b)
(authorizing appeals).
97.
See Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90, at 2 (discussing the
lack of uniformity in application of statutory enhancements). Attorney General
Ashcroft addressed the widely known practice of declining to seek “readily
provable” statutory enhancements in conjunction with a guilty plea. Id. The
Memo specifically cites two of the most common abuses of the time, the “filing of
an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 or the filing of a charge under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), are sought in all appropriate cases.” Id.
98.
Id. (discussing the lack of uniformity in “post-indictment reassessment”
or the practice of refiling less serious charges in conjunction with a plea
agreement). In cases where post-indictment circumstances cause a prosecutor to
determine in good faith that the most serious offense is not readily provable
because of a change in the evidence or some other justifiable reason (e.g., the
unavailability of a witness or the need to protect the identity of a witness until he
testifies against a more significant defendant), the prosecutor may dismiss the
charge(s) with the written or otherwise documented approval of an Assistant
Attorney General, United States Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney. Id.
99. See George C. Harris, supra note 60, at 9 (comparing so-called
“cooperation agreements” to government bribery); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From
Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor’s Expanding Power over
Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 200 (1997) (“The
prosecutor now is more of a concierge, directing which defendants may enter the
household and which rooms they may visit.”).
100. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 648–49 (discussing binding plea agreements
that were below board so as to avoid the Guidelines unworkable policy statement
in Section 6B1.2).
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As it relates to this article, the mandatory Guidelines also
affected the prosecutor’s discretion to entertain binding plea
agreements in federal court. In a 2008 law review article, Judge
John Gleeson, while presiding in the Eastern District of New York,
argued that the Guidelines curbed prosecutorial discretion in the
101
area of binding plea agreements. There are several reasons why a
prosecutor may want to enter into a binding plea agreement, as
Congress intended under Rule 11, for a lower sentence than the
102
judge may impose.
For example, agreeing to a shorter sentence may be
appropriate when there is a risk of acquittal at trial, priorities lie
with other cases and investigations, sparing the victim the
103
experience of trial, or, as discussed below, a conviction and an
104
admission of guilt are more important than a particular sentence.
The mandatory Guidelines instead dictated plea discussions,
leaving little room for the government’s opinion about an appropriate
105
106
sentence, much less a “milk of human kindness.”
Abuses of prosecutorial discretion, such as bringing the wrong
case, targeting the wrong defendants, or bringing a case for the
wrong reasons were similarly destined for a dispassionate, overly
107
formulaic, and harsh result.
The subset of criminal cases that
most incensed judges at sentencing were actually abuses of
108
Once the Guidelines neutered binding
prosecutorial discretion.
101. Id. at 640–41 (stating that “the Commission has attempted to strip
prosecutors of a power they have had for more than half a century”—the power to
negotiate and enter into binding plea agreements).
102. Id. at 640.
103. Id.
104. See supra Part V.C (discussing the Enron prosecution of the three British
bankers who pled guilty pursuant to binding plea agreements); see also Geraldine
Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing Corporate
Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (2003) (praising the Guidelines’ uniform and
unbiased treatment of white collar crime cases).
105. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ protocol
during the Guidelines era).
106. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 640 (“Sometimes, believe it or not,
prosecutors simply reveal the milk of human kindness and negotiate a lesser
sentence because it seems fair in the circumstances.”).
107. The traditional and separate decisions to investigate, charge, offer a plea,
accept an offer to plea, insist on specific terms of a plea agreement, dismiss, offer a
lesser offense or lesser sentence (with or without cooperation), and negotiate a
lesser charge or lesser sentence were combined into only a narrow set of actual
decisions. Once indicted, prosecutorial discretion, like judicial discretion, in a
criminal case narrowed significantly under the Guidelines.
108. “Congress did not create the Sentencing Commission with an eye toward
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109

plea agreements,
it also encouraged sub rosa deals, factbargaining, and improper pre-agreement ratification by the
110
court.
This stigma stays with Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreements
today and possibly poses the greatest challenge to implementing
any of the proposals in Part VI of this article.
3. Lack of Individualization at Sentencing
Sentencing proceedings under the mandatory Guidelines
reflected more computation than consideration or compassion.
The Guidelines reduced sentencing to a mathematical exercise and
111
From the
left minimal room for advocacy or judgment.
defendant’s perspective, it was not unusual for a defendant to first
meet his or her sentencing judge on the day of sentencing.
Expecting a speech, lecture, or modicum of human compassion,
the defendant was forced to endure a painful recitation of
applicable guideline provisions and calculations and, at last, a
range of months representing the narrow window of his eventual
sentence.
Because the court was not permitted to consider many
112
individual characteristics and life circumstances at sentencing,
the tone of the proceeding similarly steered elsewhere.
Information about the person before the court at sentencing
appeared in the presentence report and the court may have even
“adopted” the information as its “factual findings”; yet, these
matters were secondary to the math.
Instead of any true
eradicating prosecutorial abuses . . .” United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1408
(1st Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 518 U.S. 1016 (1996). Many of the anecdotal accounts
of the mandatory Guidelines’ constraint on the court at sentencing were actually
cases that should not be in federal court, punishable as a felony, or were worthy of
a downward departure not filed.
109. See infra Part III.B (discussing how binding plea agreements were
“meaningless” under the mandatory Guidelines).
110. See Gleeson, supra note 22, at 642 n.10, 648–49 (discussing binding plea
agreements that were sent underground by the Guidelines).
111. See supra note 62. The Guideline range is structured as a fractional
percentage of the high end of the range.
112. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, §§ 5H1.1–.16 (listing
individual characteristics and circumstances that are not ordinarily relevant to the
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range, such as: age; education and vocational skills; mental and emotional
conditions; physical condition, including drug or alcohol dependence or abuse;
gambling addiction; employment record; family ties and responsibilities;
dependence upon criminal activity for a livelihood; race, sex, national origin,
creed, religion, and socioeconomic status; and lack of guidance as a youth).
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compassion, sympathy, or guidance from the court, the sentencing
proceeding was less about the defendant, his or her life, and other
circumstances and more about the Guidelines and its calculations.
III.

MANDATORY GUIDELINES EFFECTIVELY REPLACED
BINDING PLEA AGREEMENTS

A. Binding Plea Agreements Under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C)
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs plea
agreements and the individual defendant’s rights when pleading
113
guilty to a federal offense.
Rule 11 forms the minimum
requirements for the district court’s plea colloquy with a
114
Congress, in promulgating Rule 11, included
defendant.
115
provisions encouraging specific terms in plea agreements.
116
Originally enacted as Rule 11(e), Rule 11(c) “establishe[d] a plea
agreement procedure . . . [which] permits the parties to discuss
disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the type of
agreements that the parties can reach concerning the disposition
117
of the case.”
Rule 11(e)(1), added with the 1974 amendments,
118
and later changed to Rule11(c)(1), included language about plea
agreement provisions for negotiated outcomes, including “specific
113. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; see also 24 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 611.02 (3d ed. 2010) (describing how
Rule 11 legitimizes and controls plea bargaining process); c.f. FED. R. CRIM. P. 20.
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (addressing requirements a court “must”
discuss with a defendant “[b]efore the court accepts a plea”).
115. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C). Also included in the legislation
amending Rule 11 were provisions for negotiated, joint sentencing
recommendations. See id. at 11(c)(1)(B). The district court, as with any
recommendation from the parties, could accept or reject the recommendation.
As it relates to this article, joint sentencing “recommendations” to the court under
Rule 11(c)(1)(B) do not affect the predictability of sentencing because they are
nonbinding. The certainty of an outcome is no more defined when two parties, as
opposed to one, recommend a result, yet the decision maker is free to ignore the
recommendation. For these reasons, this article focuses only on a renewed role
for binding plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
116. See Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub.
Law No. 94-64, 89 Stat. 370, 372 (1975).
117. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1975).
118. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1974) (“Subdivision (e)
provides a plea agreement procedure designed to give recognition to the
propriety of plea discussions; to bring the existence of a plea agreement out into
the open in court; and to provide methods for court acceptance or rejection of a
plea agreement.”).
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119

sentences or sentencing ranges.”
Congress encouraged parties in a criminal case to negotiate
and contract for a definitive sentence in Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which
reads as follows: “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range
is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a recommendation
or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea
120
agreement).”
The parenthetical further distinguishes the
binding plea agreement from the joint recommendation plea
agreement in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), which the court could consider or
121
ignore, without recourse for the defendant.
The procedural hurdle to the binding plea agreement was,
122
and still is, the sentencing judge’s acceptance of the agreement.
The court accepts a binding plea agreement in a separate, and
123
often later, act from accepting the guilty plea. Accepting a guilty
plea involves exploring the factual basis for the conviction, whereas
accepting a binding plea agreement involves more of a value
124
judgment about the deal.
119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C) (stating that a plea agreement may set forth
“a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case,
or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or
sentencing factor does or does not apply”); see also United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d
1283, 1283 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing that parties stipulated to a particular
sentencing range, rather than a specific sentence, in a binding plea agreement).
120. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
121. See id.
122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (1975). The Supreme Court
amendments to Rule 11(e) establish a plea agreement procedure. This procedure
permits the parties to discuss disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the
type of agreements that the parties can reach concerning the disposition of the
case. The procedure is not mandatory; a court is free not to permit the parties to
present plea agreements to it. Id. The government and the defendant are the
parties to the plea agreement. The court’s role is not to modify but only to accept
or reject. Once the court accepts a plea agreement, however, it too is bound by
the terms. See Perez v. State, 866 N.E.2d 817, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), transfer
denied, (July 25, 2007).
123. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674 (1997) (holding that
“[g]uilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the
acceptance of the two can be separated in time”). The Commentary to section
6B1.2 of the Guidelines, in fact, encouraged the judiciary to defer acceptance of a
binding plea agreement until after U.S. Probation had prepared its presentence
report. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 6B1.2 cmt.
124. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A)
(describing the court’s discretion to accept or reject a binding plea agreement).
See also infra note 219 (discussing the appellate courts’ “reasonableness” review);
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The standard for the district court’s acceptance of a binding
plea agreement, importantly, has dictated its role in federal
125
criminal practice.
Rule 11 and its advisory notes are silent as to
126
Before the
the standard for accepting binding plea agreements.
Guidelines, district courts accepted binding plea agreements if the
“specific sentence” comported with the district judge’s own sense of
127
a just and fair result.
In essence, the parties enjoyed the same
discretion to contract for an appropriate sentence as the judge had
128
to impose one.
Part VI (proposing a new standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea
agreements that mirrors the procedural and substantive components of the
appellate courts “reasonableness” review of imposed sentences).
125. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (describing the court’s discretion to
accept or reject a binding plea agreement). But see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3)
(prohibiting the court from accepting a binding plea agreement without
confirming that the plea has a factual basis); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, supra note 117.
Rule 11(e) established a plea agreement procedure, which permits the parties to
discuss “disposing of a case without a trial and sets forth the type of agreements
that the parties can reach concerning the disposition of the case. The procedure
is not mandatory; a court is free not to permit the parties to present plea
agreements to it.” Id.
126. Rule 11(e), later revised to Rule 11(c), was silent about the standard for
the court to apply when deciding to accept a binding plea agreement. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES (“Amendments have been made to Rule
11(e)(1)(B) and (C) [later revised to Rule 11(c)(1)(B) and (C)] to reflect the
impact of the Sentencing Guidelines on guilty pleas. Although Rule 11 is
generally silent on the subject, it has become clear that the courts have struggled
with the subject of guideline sentencing vis a vis plea agreements . . . .”). Under
Rule 11(e)(3), later revised to Rule 11(c)(4), the rule states that, “[i]f the court
accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed
disposition will be included in the judgment.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Navedo, 516 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1975)
(finding acceptance or rejection of any Rule 11 plea agreement reviewed for abuse
of discretion). Cases decided during the Guidelines era disregarded the
Guidelines’ policy statement in section 6B1.2 and its commentary and applied a
common sense definition of “justifiable reasons” for a binding plea agreement.
See, e.g., United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 676 (1997) (stating that the “fair and
just reason” applies to 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement acceptance); United States v.
Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the parties’ agreement
to a sentence outside of the Guidelines, but without clear departure authority, was
“justifiable”); United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (D. Neb. 2005)
(accepting an 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, even where the sentence fell outside
of the Guideline range, when premised upon “justifiable reasons”).
128. Courts have long recognized that plea agreements are subject to the law
of contracts, particularly for standards of interpretation. See United States v.
Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[p]lea bargaining . . .
though a matter of criminal jurisprudence, is subject to contract-law standards”);
see also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 18.
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B. Binding Plea Agreements Meaningless Under the Guidelines
Ironically, it was a Guidelines policy statement and its
commentary about judicial acceptance of the binding plea
agreements that chilled use of binding plea agreements during the
129
130
Guidelines era,
and still do today.
The Guidelines
recommended that the court defer acceptance of the binding plea
131
agreement until the court has reviewed the pre-sentence report.
After more than a decade and without any need to do so, the
Commission elected to set forth a new, self-interested standard for
132
judicial acceptance of binding plea agreements. Section 6B1.2(c)
of the Guidelines stated, beginning in 1987, that with a binding
plea agreement “the court may accept the agreement if the court is
satisfied either that: . . . the agreed sentence is within the
applicable guideline range; or . . . the agreed sentence departs
133
from the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons . . . .”
In an early 1989 amendment to the Commentary for Section
6B1.2 and again without any need to do so, the Commission
134
unilaterally defined “justifiable reasons.”
The Guidelines stated
that
the court should accept a . . . specific sentence only if the
court is satisfied either that such sentence is . . . within the
applicable guideline range or, if not, that the sentence
departs from the applicable guideline range for justifiable
129. When promulgated, Rule 11(e)(1), later revised to Rule 11(c)(1),
explicitly permitted plea agreements between the government and a defendant
and, according to the Second Circuit, “specifically provide[d] for possible
concessions that the government may make in a plea agreement, in addition to
reduction of the charge to a lesser or related offense.” United States v. Burruezo,
704 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, ADVISORY COMM. NOTES
(1976)) (emphasis added).
130. See infra Part VI (advocating for Congress to amend Rule 11 or the
Commission to redraft the applicable Guidelines’ policy statements).
131. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.1(c) cmt.
132. See Id.; see also Gleeson, supra note 22, at 645–46 (calling the policy
statement governing the acceptance of binding plea agreements a “defect” and
criticizing the Commission’s implementation of important change through its
commentary).
133. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 6B1.2(c) (2009), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009_guidelines/Manual/GL2009.pdf (emphasis
added). The policy statement provided the flexibility for parties to enter into
meaningful plea agreements as Congress intended under Rule 11(c); it allowed
parties to agree to, and judges to accept, a favorable sentence for a defendant
based upon “justifiable reasons” in subsection (2) and without regard for the
“applicable guideline range” in subsection (1). Id.
134. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, § 6B1.2 cmt.
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reasons (i.e., that such departure is authorized by 18
135
U.S.C. § 3553(b) [the mandatory Guidelines]).
The Commentary continued by stating that “the court may not
depart below the applicable guideline range merely because of the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a
136
plea agreement . . . .”
In sum, according to the Guidelines’ policy statement, the
court shall only accept binding plea agreements if the court could
137
have imposed the specific sentence in its limited discretion.
Some
courts did not consider this policy statement in Section 6B1.2 as
138
mandatory or binding.
139
The DOJ also held back the important function of binding
plea agreements and chilled prosecutors from using them for more
140
Through its alignment and allegiance to the
than twenty years.
135. Id. (emphasis added). The comment continued to explain that “those
reasons are specifically set forth in writing in the statement of reasons or the
judgment and commitment order. As set forth in subsection (d) of § 5K2.0
(Grounds for Departure), however, the court may not depart below the applicable
guideline range merely because of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the
offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense.” Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.; see also supra notes 63–65 (discussing the district court’s narrow
departure authority); supra notes 88–94 (discussing prosecutorial discretion and
departures from sentences under the Guidelines); infra notes 139–41 (discussing
the PROTECT Act and DOJ protocol calling for fewer downward departures and
fewer instances of below-Guidelines sentences).
138. See United States v. Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Plea
agreements can retain their authority to bind the government, the defendant and
the district court even when they provide for sentences that depart from the
prescriptions of the guidelines.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Gilchrist, 130
F.3d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir. 1997) (“An 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement, once accepted,
binds the district court notwithstanding departures from the applicable
guidelines.”).
139. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650, 675
(2003); Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90. In a memorandum
following Congress’s passage of the PROTECT Act and in a section entitled
“Sentence Bargaining,” Attorney General Ashcroft directed federal prosecutors
that sentences may only be reduced via the sentencing guidelines range or
departures. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 1. The Department of
Justice echoed the Guidelines’ policy statements and further discouraged binding
plea agreements in federal practice. See supra Part II.C (discussing DOJ protocol
and the guidance from the Attorney Generals under the Guidelines). In sum,
DOJ functionally prohibited federal prosecutors from contracting for a sentence
not called for by the Guidelines. Id.
140. See Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90. Attorney General
Ashcroft stated,
[F]ederal prosecutors must not request or accede to a downward
departure except in the limited circumstances specified in this
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Guidelines, the DOJ implicitly prohibited federal prosecutors from
141
Federal
agreeing to specific sentences below the Guidelines.
prosecutors, pursuant to the Attorney General’s memoranda, were
to argue for a Guidelines sentence, oppose motions for a belowGuidelines sentence, and report instances when a court imposed a
142
below-Guidelines sentence.
To enter into a binding plea
agreement as Congress intended under Rule 11, one that offers the
defendant a lower sentence, the prosecutor would have to
contravene the Attorney General’s directive and, if the agreement
was accepted, report the judge.
Some district courts disfavored binding plea agreements
during the mandatory Guidelines era, even as seldom as they were
143
used.
The few binding agreements that surfaced during the
mandatory Guidelines era derived from one of the following
interpretations: Rule 11 trumps the Guidelines’ policy
144
statements;
Rule 11 provides for the nonapplicability of
memorandum and with authorization from an Assistant Attorney
General, United States Attorney, or designated supervisory attorney.
Likewise, except in such circumstances and with such authorization,
prosecutors may not simply stand silent when a downward departure
motion is made by the defendant. Id.
141. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 3. Attorney General
Ashcroft reiterated DOJ’s protocol to combat all downward departure motions
and addressed binding plea agreements specifically, “if the agreement is for a
specific sentence under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the agreement must not vitiate relevant
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Id.
142. Ashcroft September 2003 Memo, supra note 90.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Seidman, 483 F. Supp 156, 158 (E.D. Wis. 1980)
(“At the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a Rule 11(e)(1)(C)
type plea agreement. It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of
sentence that should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or
she has been adjudged guilty.”); cf. United States v. Coney, 390 F. Supp. 2d 844,
845 (D. Neb. 2005) (“When such a plea agreement smells too much like cow
manure siphoned from a feedlot after a swampy, summer rain, judges should not
pretend the odor is lilac. On the other hand, if the plea agreement stinks, but the
stench is more like kitty litter than cow manure, a judge should hold his or her
nose and move on. The trick is to discern the difference.”).
144. Cases decided during the Guidelines era disregarded the Guidelines’
policy statement in Section 6B1.2 and its commentary and applied a commonsense
definition of “justifiable reasons” for a binding plea agreement. See, e.g., Coney, 390
F. Supp. 2d at 850 (accepting an 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, even where the
sentence fell outside of the Guidelines range, when premised upon “justifiable
reasons”); United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 344–347 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that the parties’ agreement to a sentence outside of the Guidelines, but
without clear departure authority, was “justifiable”); United States v. Hyde, 520
U.S. 670, 676 (1997) (“fair and just reason” applies to 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement
acceptance).
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Guidelines’ provisions, including Section 6B1.2 and its
145
commentary, which discouraged binding plea agreements; or the
sentiment that with the parties and court in agreement as to an
appropriate sentence, there was no one left to challenge a
downward deviation from the Guidelines range.
IV.

THE GAME CHANGER OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER

Prior to 2005, the mandatory Guidelines constrained federal
146
district courts’ sentencing discretion for nearly twenty years.
Booker rendered the Guidelines “advisory” and restored discretion
147
to the trial courts at sentencing.
District courts now sentence
individual defendants according to policy statements, a
“consultation” of the Guidelines, and generalized notions of
148
fairness, consistency, and the interests of justice.
The effect of
the Court’s remedy in Booker was unrelated to the constitutional
149
The effect of Booker,
challenge upon which review was granted.
however, is progressive and dramatic.
A. The Gradual Constitutional Challenge to Judicial Fact Finding at
Sentencing
For all of the criticism of the Guidelines as mandatory, overly
formulaic, or impersonal, it was a Sixth Amendment challenge to a
judge’s findings of sentencing enhancements by a lesser standard
150
The
of proof that rendered the Guidelines “advisory” in Booker.
line of cases began in the 1990s and surfaced every few years,
151
causing some havoc in federal practice.
The constitutional
145. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (stating that the parties may agree to the
nonapplicability of Guidelines’ provisions). While there is no reported case that
states that the binding plea agreement included an agreement about the
nonapplicability of the policy statement about accepting a binding plea agreement
in Section 6B1.2, it is feasible.
146. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 246–47; see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent
remedy in Booker and how the constitutional violations could have been entrusted
to prosecutorial discretion).
149. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent remedy in Booker).
150. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245–46; see also James L. Buchwalter, Annotation,
Construction and Application of Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury—Supreme Court
Cases, 6 A.L.R. FED. 2D 213 (2005).
151. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 242 (1999) (discussing the
Sixth Amendment concerns raised in McMillan as it “broached the potential
constitutional significance of factfinding that raised the sentencing ceiling”);
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challenge did not relate to the substance of the mandatory
152
Guidelines or its effect on a particular class of defendants.
153
Instead, the challenge concerned the process employed by district
court judges in making findings of fact in accordance with the
154
The eventual remedy in Booker, as
Commission’s formula.
discussed below, bears no relation to these procedural
155
challenges.
The constitutional challenge and analysis turned on
156
determinations of elements versus “sentencing factors.”
An
indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges
and the government must then prove each element beyond a

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment
right to jury determination of all “ultimate facts concerning the offense
committed”); cf. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–47 (1998)
(distinguishing between elements of crimes and sentencing factors).
152. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the gradual constitutional challenge that
culminated in the Court’s decision in Booker and the remedy of the “advisory
Guidelines”).
153. See infra Part VI.A. In cases that went to trial during the mandatory
Guidelines era, juries in most federal criminal trials were asked to return verdicts
of guilt based upon the government’s proof of the elements of a crime only. They
typically did not, at the time of the verdict using the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard, render additional findings related to aggregating factors related to the
offense, conduct, or the defendant’s background. The line of cases in the
developing constitutional challenge to this process that culminated with Booker
addressed the right to have the jury decide, in addition to elements, the applicable
sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines using the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard in criminal cases. See infra Part IV.A.
154. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1. See supra Part II (discussing the
complex formula and mathematical complexity of the Guidelines). In practice,
the district court judge would enter a finding related to these enhancements at
sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard. For example, in a
fraud case that went to trial, the government may have proved and the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on wire fraud, a scheme to defraud carried out
through the use of an interstate wire. For illustration, the offense of conviction
carries with it applicable Guidelines enhancements based upon the amount of
money at issue in the fraud and the number of victims impacted. The government
was not required to and may not have presented evidence of these potential
enhancements at trial. The district judge at sentencing would then decide
whether a Guidelines enhancement applied, whether presented at trial or not,
using a preponderance of the evidence standard.
155. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246–47. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the incongruent
remedy in Booker).
156. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 79 (among the first cases in which the Court used
“sentencing factor” to refer to a fact that was not found by the jury but could affect
the sentence imposed by the judge); see also Buchwalter, supra note 150, § 14
(discussing cases where no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial held for
“sentencing factors”).
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157

reasonable doubt in a criminal case. Conversely, the government
need not set forth factors relevant only to the sentencing of a
defendant who is convicted of the charged crime, and it need not
158
present evidence at trial in support of the enhancement.
Congress, over time, began to clearly establish its legislative intent
to promulgate sentencing factors instead of additional elements
159
and new crimes.
The Supreme Court devoted several cases
leading up to Booker sorting out elements from sentencing factors
and the process of increasing a defendant’s exposure for the first
160
time at sentencing.
161
the Court
In 1998, in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
reiterated Congress’s power to draft sentencing factors and the
district court’s ability to enhance a defendant’s sentence based
162
upon a sentencing factor.
In Almendarez-Torres, the Court held
that a sentencing factor based upon the defendant’s recidivism in
an illegal reentry prosecution was a penalty provision that
163
authorized an enhanced sentence.
Because it did not create a
separate crime, the government was not required to allege the
earlier conviction in the indictment or prove it at trial beyond a
164
reasonable doubt.
157. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974).
158. United States v. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (“An
indictment must set forth each element of the crime that it charges.” (citing
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604
(1994) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the
legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of
statute.” (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))); McMillan,
477 U.S. at 84–91 (holding that indictments need not set forth sentencing factors,
as the question of sentencing factors versus crime elements are normally a matter
for Congress).
159. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604. But see McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–91 (setting limits
of Congress’s power to determine elements versus sentencing factors).
160. See Buchwalter, supra, note 150 (compiling and distinguishing the Court’s
cases related to judicial fact-finding and the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial).
161. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
162. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228 (“Within limits, the question of
[sentencing factors versus elements of crimes] is normally a matter for Congress.”
(citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84–91)); see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 604 (definition of
a criminal offense entrusted to the legislature, “particularly in the case of federal
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute” (quoting Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985))).
163. See Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226–27.
164. Id. at 226 (“[I]f the provision simply authorizes an enhanced sentence
when an offender also has an earlier conviction, then the indictment need not
mention that fact, for the fact of an earlier conviction is not an element of the
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165

In Jones v. United States in 1999, the Court reached the exact
opposite result in analyzing the enhancements related to
166
aggravating circumstances within the offense conduct.
The Jones
court again distinguished between elements of the offense that
must be alleged in the indictment and proved at trial, as compared
to “sentencing factors” which could be first addressed at
167
sentencing.
The Court’s analysis focused on the statute at issue,
the notice afforded to a defendant by the offense charged in the
168
indictment, and the maximum punishment for the offense.
In
Jones, the Court held that the federal carjacking statute set forth not
sentencing factors, but three separate offenses with additional
elements that must be charged by indictment, proven beyond a
169
reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.
170
Next, in Apprendi v. New Jersey in 2000, the Court considered
a sentencing factor that enhanced, or could potentially enhance, a
defendant’s sentence above the maximum punishment of the
171
offense charged in the indictment and proved at trial.
The
government indicted Apprendi in New Jersey state court for a gun
172
violation that carried a five-to-ten year maximum punishment.
After Apprendi pleaded guilty, the prosecutor filed a motion to
enhance the sentence under the state’s hate crime statute, and the
court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the shooting
was racially motivated and sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year
173
term on the firearms count. By contrast, in Almendarez-Torres, the
sentencing factor of recidivism increased the potential sentence for
the defendant, but the resulting enhanced sentence remained

present crime.”).
165. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
166. Id. at 235 (“Here, [as opposed to Almendarez-Torres], the search for
comparable examples more readily suggests that Congress had separate and
aggravated offenses in mind when it employed the scheme of [the relevant
statutes].”).
167. Id. at 232 (“Much turns on the determination that a fact is an element of
an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven by the Government
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (referencing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
117 (1974)); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509–10 (1995))).
168. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–31.
169. Id. at 231–32.
170. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
171. Id. at 468–69.
172. Id. at 469–71.
173. Id. at 470–71.
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174

below the statutory maximum for illegal reentry. In Apprendi, the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires that any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction (the
Almendarez-Torres exception), must be submitted to a jury and
175
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court decided Blakely v.
176
Washington, invalidating a sentence imposed under the State of
Washington’s mandatory sentencing guideline system.
The
Supreme Court held that the Washington Guidelines violated the
177
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
The
government requested Blakely receive a standard-range sentence
under a plea agreement, but the judge imposed a harsher
punishment based on an enhancement not presented in the
178
charging papers yet found by the court at sentencing. In Blakely,
the Court correctly interpreted the rule in Apprendi to define
“maximum punishment” as the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the elements of the offense found by the jury, not
as the maximum sentence based on additional findings used at the
179
sentencing stage to increase the maximum punishment.
The Court in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely struck down the
higher sentence imposed by the trial court and classified the
enhancement at issue as an element that must have been proved at

174. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 243–44 (1998).
175. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000) (distinguishing
Almendarez-Torres on the basis that recidivism “does not relate to the commission of
the offense” itself).
176. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
177. Id. at 313–14.
178. Id. at 300.
179. Compare id. at 303–04 (“[T]he ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes
is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602
(2002))), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482–83 (“The historic link between verdict and
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the
limits of the legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative scheme
that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that, if found, exposes the
criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.”). See also
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 563 (2002) (“Any ‘fact that . . . exposes the
criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’ . . . would have
been, under the prevailing historical practice, an element of an aggravated
offense.” (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483)).
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180

trial. The Supreme Court did not address the Guidelines in these
cases and did not mention the mandatory nature of the sentencing
scheme in effect at the time. In Apprendi and Blakely, the Supreme
Court considered state sentences imposed by state judges based
181
upon specific state statutes.
In Jones, the Court analyzed
aggravating factors in a federal statute, and the Guidelines again
182
were not at issue.
More at issue in Jones, Apprendi, and Blakely
were concerns for unfair surprise by the government and lack of
183
notice to the defendant.
Again, the constitutional challenge to
sentencing enhancements and sliding maximum punishments in
these cases did not implicate the Guidelines or otherwise relate to
section 3553(b), which made the Guidelines mandatory in federal
184
court.
Although the Court reserved opinion on the Guidelines,
185
Blakely impacted federal practice immediately.
Following Blakely,
district and circuit courts voiced varying opinions on the
186
Federal
implication of the decision for federal sentencing.
criminal practice after Blakely varied widely, and some courts, eager
180. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones v. United States,
526 U.S. 227, 227 (1999).
181. See Kathleen H. Morkes, Where Are We Going, Where Did We Come From: Why
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Were Invalidated and the Consequences for State
Sentencing Schemes, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 249, 275–279 (2006) (describing how states
had to reform their state sentencing regimes to conform with Blakely).
182. Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
183. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
See generally Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a “Crime” the Government Did Not Prove:
Jones v. United States and the Constitutional Limitations on Factfinding by Sentencing
Factors Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249 (1998)
(discussing the constitutional due process issues presented by sentencing
enhancements).
184. See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 466; Jones, 526 U.S. at 227.
185. See United States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558, 566 (3d Cir. 2006); United States
v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d
252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir.
2005); United States v. Cordoza-Estrada, 385 F.3d 56, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2004); United
States v. Lopez-Zamora, 392 F.3d 1087, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2004), withdrawn, 418
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mendoza-Mesa, 384 F.3d 951, 953 n.2
(8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1181 (2005); United States v. Monsalve, 388 F.3d
71, 72 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Smith, 393 F.3d 717, 718 (7th Cir. 2004).
186. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal
Sentencing System be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 217, 219 (2004) (“Blakely has created a ghastly mess, bringing the
federal criminal justice system to a virtual halt and putting a number of state
systems in disarray.” (citations omitted)); Stephanie Gosnell, Hurricane Blakely and
the Calm After the Storm Found in Booker, 58 ARK. L. REV. 449, 464–69 (2005)
(discussing the confusion among state courts after the decision in Blakely).
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to be freed from the mandatory scheme’s reign, began to disregard
187
Federal
the Guidelines in federal sentencing proceedings.
defendants contributed to the discord by pleading guilty to crimes,
yet refusing to admit to applicable enhancements. The confusion,
disarray, and gamesmanship led to the Court taking up review of
the Guidelines only six months later in Booker, as well as another
188
case presenting similar issues, United States v. Fanfan.
On January 12, 2005, a split majority of the Supreme Court
decided Booker and applied Blakely to the mandatory sentencing
189
scheme under the Guidelines. In Booker, a narcotics prosecution,
the Court reviewed the government’s appeal after the Seventh
Circuit, relying on Blakely, reversed a sentencing enhancement
190
under the Guidelines that the judge applied at sentencing.
The
enhancement increased Booker’s sentence because of an
additional amount of drugs that, while not in the indictment nor
presented at trial, was attributable to him as “relevant conduct”
191
under the Guidelines.
The district court sentenced Booker to
thirty years, below the maximum punishment in his case from its
192
inception, life imprisonment.
The first majority opinion in Booker, although addressing the
Sixth Amendment violation and extending the Almendarez-Torres
rule to Guideline enhancements, foreshadowed the ultimate
193
remedy adopted by the Court.
“If the Guidelines as currently
written could be read as merely advisory provisions that
recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular
sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not
194
implicate the Sixth Amendment.”
In Booker, the Supreme Court
struggled for a remedy to the Sixth Amendment violation that
“maintain[s] a strong connection between the sentence imposed
and the offender’s real conduct—a connection important to the
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress intended its
195
The Court linked the sentencing
Guidelines system to achieve.”

187. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228–29 (2005) (describing
the lower court’s decision to ignore the federal Guidelines).
188. Id. at 229 (consolidating Fanfan and Booker on appeal).
189. Id. at 226.
190. Id. at 227.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 244.
194. Id. at 233.
195. Id. at 246.
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goal of uniformity with the necessary remedy to the Sixth
Amendment violation related to district court judges finding
196
guideline enhancements.
Unlike in Blakely, under the mandatory Guidelines, Booker
long knew about his offense’s maximum punishment of life, the
additional drugs forming the basis of his enhancement at
sentencing, and his applicable sentencing range of thirty years to
197
life. The lack of unfair surprise and the notice to the defendant
distinguishes Booker from its progeny. Instead, after Blakely, some
Justices on the Court had the mandatory Guidelines in their
198
sight.
B. Incongruent Remedy in Booker
When the Court confronted the question of a remedy, a
different majority weighed two options. The first “would engraft
onto the existing system today’s Sixth Amendment ‘jury trial’
199
requirement.”
The second, as previewed by the first majority in
discussing the constitutional violation, would maintain the
mandatory Guidelines and its judicial findings, yet, as a final
matter, reduce the resulting range to a mere advisory factor that
200
the court may consider. The second majority observed that it was
not possible to “maintain the judicial factfinding that Congress
thought would underpin the mandatory Guidelines system” after
196. Id. at 263.
197. Id. at 334 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike the Washington state
system at issue in Blakely, the federal system in Booker provides a defendant with no
guarantee that the jury’s finding of factual elements will result in a sentence lower
than the statutory maximum. Rather, the statutes put a potential federal
defendant on notice that a judge conceivably might sentence him anywhere within
the range provided by statute—regardless of the applicable Guidelines range); see
also Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995) (“We thus made clear that use
of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant's sentence for a
separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute
punishment for that conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.”); Comment, Sixth Amendment—State Sentencing Guidelines, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 333, 339–40 (2004) (stating that departure provisions indicate that the cases
in which courts should depart are narrow, but without limiting judicial
interpretation, departure remains possible in every case, suggesting that an
increased sentence is never above “the maximum [a judge] may impose without
any additional findings.” (citing Blakely, 524 U.S. 296, 302 (2004))).
198. See Douglas B. Bloom, United States v. Booker and United States v.
Fanfan: The Tireless March of Apprendi and the Intracourt Battle to Save Sentencing
Reform, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 539, 542 (2005).
199. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
200. Id. at 246–47.
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the first majority found judicial findings of applicable
201
enhancements.
After the Court’s decision six months earlier in Blakely, some
district courts already required the government to present and
juries to find applicable guideline enhancements using the beyond
202
a reasonable doubt standard.
In other words, in some
jurisdictions, the government was already doing what the Court
considered “impossible” in Booker.
In most instances, jury
factfinding of sentencing enhancements in the Guidelines was
possible.
Jury factfinding did not alter the government’s proof
significantly in most cases. In some other cases, if a defendant
admitted to the elements of the crime, but not the enhancement,
then the process was complicated and lengthened by requiring
separate phases of a trial, including on just the enhancement as
203
opposed to the elements of the crime.
Arguably, the most
complicating feature of judicial factfinding of sentencing factors
lies in the careful construction of a special verdict form and
additional jury instructions, explaining elements, deciding guilt,
204
and thereafter finding sentencing factors.
Not discussed in Booker was another option: prosecutors could
resolve some of the issues associated with jury factfinding within
their discretion. For example, following a guilty plea to the
elements alone, the prosecutor would in some cases decide not to
pursue quantitatively minor enhancements. In other cases, the
enhancement may be the important determining factor and worthy
of a jury trial. Prosecutorial discretion could allow a jury
factfinding system to work with a mandatory sentencing scheme. It
is unknown, however, the effect of such discretion on the
sentencing goals of uniformity and proportionality or the corollary
notion of predictability for the defendant.

201. Id. at 246.
202. See supra note 222 (citing post-Blakely cases).
203. See, e.g., Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 215 (2006) (deciding a
post-Blakely, pre-Booker trial where prosecutors submitted “special verdict forms” to
the jury so that it may decide sentencing factors in the case beyond a reasonable
doubt). Federal criminal practice has a similar process with asset forfeiture
allegations and death penalty considerations.
204. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665,
677–78 (2005) (discussing the constitutional holding and the Court’s remedy).
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Nevertheless, the second majority, without discussing the postBlakely practice or the true viability of other remedies for the
constitutional violation, concluded that the process of jury
factfinding under the Guidelines was impracticable, unsustainable,
205
and inefficient.
The second majority opted to sever and excise
Section 3553(b), which required district courts to apply the
Guidelines, and the related standard of review section, Section
206
3742(e), which applies only in a mandatory federal scheme. The
result was that the Guidelines, after almost twenty years of
mandatory application at federal sentencing, were rendered
207
"effectively advisory."
C. The Post-Booker Effect
The sea change that resulted from the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker seemingly improved federal
sentencing for the judiciary, the prosecution, and the defense.
Federal district court judges enjoy true discretion at sentencing
208
once again.
After several years of “advisory Guidelines,” courts
have exercised that discretion decidedly in favor of the criminal
defendant imposing lower sentences than were called for when the
209
Guidelines were mandatory.
Booker even liberated some federal
210
prosecutors from a rigid aspect of federal criminal justice.
The Booker court further devoted its attention to the process of
211
federal sentencing in the wake of its remedy.
The Court
instructed that “[t]he district courts, while not bound to apply the
Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into
212
account when sentencing.”
This would mean that the district
courts still set sentencing hearings with ample time for the
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44.
Id. at 245–46.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006) (presenting the finding that
“[t]he rate of government-sponsored, below-range sentences has increased slightly
after Booker, . . . [including] substantial assistance[,] . . . . Early Disposition
Program departures . . . and other government-sponsored downward departures”),
with supra notes 88–92, 135–37 (discussing DOJ protocol and the PROTECT Act
aimed at defending the Guidelines and reducing the incidence of belowGuidelines sentences).
211. Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44.
212. Id. at 264.

2011]

THE PENDULUM IN FEDERAL SENTENCING

509

preparation of a presentence report (PSR) and full Guidelines
analysis and calculations. The district court would still decide
guideline enhancements and reductions and arrive at the
applicable guideline range, as it did when the Guidelines were
mandatory. The trial court still decides motions for departure
from the applicable guideline range, yet it is not required to value
the departure if granted.
Only after the familiar calculations and judicial findings does
the sentencing court now “tailor the sentence in light of other
213
statutory concerns.”
Congress previously set forth seven “factors
214
to be considered” in § 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code.
The factors are sufficiently broad to justify any reasonable variance,
and almost any variance from the Guidelines range with or without
a viable ground for departure. They include the “nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant”; the “need for the sentence . . . to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense; . . . afford adequate
215
deterrence; . . . [and] protect the public.”
The court must also
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
216
of similar conduct.”
The sentencing court, after Booker, must
consider the factors in § 3553(a), the applicable Guidelines
calculations, and departure provisions and policy statements on the
record as justification for the sentence to be imposed. However,
after navigating the procedural hurdles and making a record of the
panoply of “sentencing considerations,” the district court judge is
free in most cases to impose a sentence from probation to the
statutory maximum.

213. Id. at 245.
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1–7) (2009). Section 3553(a) factors include the
following: (1) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant
as set forth in the Guidelines; (2) any pertinent policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission; (3) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities; (4) the need to provide restitution to victims; and (5) the requirement
to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect
for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the
public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training and medical care. Id.
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2009).
216. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–60.
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Upon exercising the de novo standard of review called for in
the statute, the Supreme Court directed courts of appeal to “review
217
sentencing decisions for unreasonableness.” The defendant may
challenge and the appellate courts may review the imposed
218
Reasonableness,
sentence under a “reasonableness” standard.
219
the new standard of appellate review, has taken some time to
220
First, the appellate court’s reasonableness review will
formulate.
enjoy abuse of discretion-type deference, regardless of the imposed
221
sentences’ relation to a Guideline sentence.
Second, and most
important to the proposals outlined in this article, reasonableness
review on appeal incorporates procedural and substantive
222
components.

217. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264 (“We infer appropriate review standards from
related statutory language, the structure of the statute, and the ‘sound
administration of justice’ . . . [a]nd in this instance those factors, in addition to the
past two decades of appellate practice in cases involving departures, imply a
practical standard of review already familiar to appellate courts: review for
‘unreasonable[ness].’”). See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (2009); see also Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 341 (2007) (“The federal courts of appeals review federal
sentences and set aside those they find ‘unreasonable.’” (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at
261–63)); United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007); Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007); Berman, supra note 23, at 143; Jefferson Exum,
supra note 23, at 118.
218. Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61.
219. In Booker, the Court also struck down § 3742(e) because it crossreferenced § 3553(b). Section 3742(e) set forth the standard of review before
“reasonableness.” Section 3742(e) stated that appellate courts were to review
sentences to determine whether they were (1) in violation of law; (2) resulting
from an incorrect application of the Guidelines; (3) outside of the applicable
Guidelines range; and (4) whether the district court failed to provide a written
statement of reasons, or the sentence departed from the Guidelines range based
on an improper factor or in contradiction to the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (Supp.
2005).
220. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–49; Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at
91.
221. See Gall, 522 U.S. at 51.
222. See id.; United States v. Irizarry, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (refusing to require
the district court to provide notice to the parties that it intends to vary its imposed
sentence from the Guidelines). For the procedural component, the appellate
court must first ensure that the district court “committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
For the substantive component, the reasonableness review is an abuse of discretion
type standard, where the appellate court should afford “due deference to the
district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify [the
sentence].” Id.
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Because of the constitutional holding and the procedural
guidance in Booker, the confusion about proving sentencing
enhancements and imposing a sentence came to rest.
By
rendering the Guidelines advisory, the litigation process returned
to the prosecution proving elements beyond a reasonable doubt
and district court judges’ findings of sentencing factors by a
preponderance of the evidence. More important than procedural
changes after Booker is the shift toward judicial discretion, lower
sentences for defendants, and liberated prosecutors at federal
sentencing.
1. The Return of Judicial Discretion at Sentencing
Following Booker, district courts again enjoy discretion at
223
sentencing.
Restoring discretion to district judges may be the
best explanation of how the constitutional challenge to judicial fact
finding resulted in the Court’s remedy in Booker and the “advisory”
224
Guidelines.
The district court, after navigating the procedural
225
steps, now enjoys the freedom to impose a sentence between the
statutory minimum (often no jail time) and the statutory
maximum.

223. See, e.g., United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 750–52 (E.D.N.Y.
2008). The district court reasoned, “[I]f not for the wisdom of the Supreme Court
in recognizing the need to free district courts from the shackles of the mandatory
guidelines regime, I would have been confronted with the prospect of having to
impose what I believe any rational jurist would consider to be a draconian
sentence.” Id. With an advisory guidelines range of 360 months to life, the Parris
court imposed 60 months imprisonment for a fraud resulting in more than $2.5
million in loss and involving 500 victims. Id.
224. See United State v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); see also Fisher, supra
note 6, at 74–77 (2007), which discusses that, as written, the Guidelines violated
the Sixth Amendment. Fact findings increase the term to which a defendant may
be sentenced. This operation of the Guidelines violated Apprendi. However, in the
remedial part of the opinion, the Booker court rendered the Guidelines effectively
advisory, thereby taking them outside of the scope of Apprendi. Id.
225. Compare Gall, 522 U.S. at 51 (discussing the possible procedural error the
district court must now navigate at sentencing post-Booker, such as “failing to
calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors . . . , or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range”), with infra Part VI (proposing amendments
to Rule 11 and the Guidelines that require the district court to conduct the same
procedural reasonableness review of a binding plea agreement and “specific
sentence” therein).
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Increasingly since Booker, courts’ sentences fall below the
226
applicable range of imprisonment called for when the Guidelines
were mandatory. The sentencing court can support almost any
sentence post-Booker with the broad policy statements and statutory
factors that judges must now consider. District court judges very
seldom have exercised their discretion to hand down harsher
227
sentences post-Booker.
The judicial discretion of today promises not to present the
same problems of pre-Guidelines discretion. Almost twenty years
with the Guidelines and the post-Booker process ensures that district
courts will exercise their discretion more appropriately and
228
consistently with the goals of uniformity and proportionality.
This article’s criticism of restored judicial discretion relates to its
incompatibility with binding plea agreements and the
counterbalance of the defendant’s interest in predictability.

226. In federal criminal law, organizations gather and practitioners discuss
sentencing data in terms of months of imprisonment. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, supra note 1, § 5A. Other sentencing options and punishments are
available by statute and under the Guidelines, including probation, community
confinement, home confinement, supervised release, fines, restitution, and
forfeiture, as well as certain collateral consequences of a federal conviction. For
purposes of this article, the net benefit to the criminal defendant since Booker is
more easily presented in terms of lower terms of imprisonment.
227. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 2ND
QUARTER RELEASE, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N tbl.1 (2010), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly
_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Quarter_Report_2nd.pdf [hereinafter Q2
2010 DATA] (finding that a little over 500 of the nearly 40,000 sentences, about
one percent, were above-Guidelines sentences relying on Booker or § 3553(a), as
opposed to the court’s grant of a government upward departure under the
Guidelines); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and
_Reports/Submissions/200603_Booker/Booker_Report.pdf [hereinafter BOOKER
REPORT] (“The rate of imposition of above-range sentences [was] . . . 1.6 percent
after Booker.”).
228. Booker, 523 U.S. at 243–44 (setting out the procedural requirements for
post-Booker and the “reasonableness” framework of appellate review). The
procedural requirement of the Guidelines, particularly after almost twenty years of
mandatory application, promises to yield more uniform and reasoned sentences
than from the judicial discretion before the mandatory Guidelines. Id.
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2. The Statistical Benefit to Defendants
The statistics in the four years following Booker speak well for
229
the individual defendant.
While the Commission wishes to
230
interpret the data as status quo, the sentences imposed since
Booker reflect that judicial discretion and prosecutorial flexibility
231
favor the defendant and should continue to do so. The judiciary
has spoken more clearly about certain types of prosecutions and
232
defendants.
For example, district court judges, by their
sentences, have commented on the federal system’s treatment of
233
first-time offenders, as well as so-called “career offenders.”
The Commission, in its Booker Report released in 2006, stated
that “[a] lack of uniformity that existed pre-Booker in the reporting
of sentencing information to the Commission, especially the

229. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, preamble at vii (“The rate of governmentsponsored, below-range sentences has increased . . . after Booker to a rate of 23.7
percent [in 2006.] . . . The rate of imposition of [other] below-range sentences
has increased after Booker to a rate of 12.5 percent[,] . . . [and i]n approximately
two-thirds of cases involving [other] below-range sentences, the extent of the
reductions granted are less than 40 percent below the minimum of the range.”);
Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227, at tbls.1 & 2 (demonstrating that, between October
2009 and March 2010, less than fifty-seven percent of sentences were within or
above the Guidelines range and, in almost thirteen percent of cases, district courts
impose a lower sentence, citing Booker or § 3553(a), as opposed to a recognized
departure in the Guidelines).
230. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at vi. The Commission attempts to classify
its post-Booker statistics as highly consistent with the mandatory Guidelines
statistics. For example: “National data show that when within-range sentences and
government-sponsored, below-range sentences are combined, the rate of sentencing in
conformance with the sentencing guidelines is 85.9 percent. This conformance
rate remained stable throughout the year that followed Booker.” Id. (emphasis
added). The statistic is misleading because it fails to account for the additional
government-sponsored, below-Guidelines sentences and the significant variances
awarded in the majority of below-Guidelines sentences imposed post-Booker.
231. See supra note 229.
232. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at ix–xi.
233. Id. “The rate of imposition of below-range sentences for first offenders
increased after Booker. . . . [and t]he rate of imposition of below-range sentences
for career offenders increased after Booker.” Id. at x; see also Q2 2010 DATA, supra
note 227, at tbl.3 (aggregating sentencing data by offense conduct category, for
example, courts recently imposed below-Guidelines sentences without grounds for
Guidelines departures often in white collar, pornography, and drug trafficking
offenses); cf. Marcia Coyle, Justice Department Calls for Probe of Federal Sentencing
Patterns, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 2010, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj
/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202463650912&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (“Those widely
disparate sentences don’t make sense, ignore federal sentencing guidelines and
are a sign of a potentially very big problem, according to the U.S. Department of
Justice.”).

514

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

reporting of reasons for the sentence imposed, was exacerbated
234
post-Booker.” The Commission also reported that the results were
too preliminary to understand the decision’s effects.
“The
differences in practice and procedure that resulted from Booker are
not entirely quantifiable, and this impacts the quality of the data
235
collected.”
Statistics represent generalized trends. Yet, has the federal
system revived the pre-Guidelines problem of a defendant’s
sentence depending more upon the judge imposing sentence than
the process required at sentencing? The generation of judges that
has presided on the federal bench only during the mandatory
Guidelines era may cling to the structure of the Guidelines and
reserve variances only for an occasional outlier case. Courts have
identified a problem of “guidelineism,” or “guidelinitis”—the
inability of some federal courts to break their habit of mechanically
236
relying on the Guidelines alone. Most district judges since Booker
may impose a lower sentence for a defendant in certain cases; the
variable for some defendants is in appreciating where their case fits
in.
3. Liberated Federal Prosecutors
The return of judicial discretion to the courts was not only
237
significant for defendants, but also for the government.
Government attorneys, too, were liberated from the mandatory
federal sentencing scheme post-Booker. After Booker, the judiciary
has imposed sentences based more upon government-sponsored
238
motions rather than those based upon substantial assistance.
234. BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at v.
235. Id. at vi.
236. See United States v. Sedore, 512 F.3d 819, 828–29 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt,
J., dissenting).
237. Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227, at tbl.1; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: 3RD QUARTER RELEASE, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N tbls.1 & 2 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics
/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2010_Qua
rter_Report_3rd.pdf [hereinafter Q3 2010 DATA] (demonstrating the increase in
the categories of “government sponsored” motions and the increase in judicial
variances that the government may not be opposing as vehemently post-Booker); cf.
supra notes 88–92, 134–137 (discussing the DOJ protocol during the mandatory
Guidelines to argue for Guidelines sentences and oppose all motions for
downward departure or otherwise lower sentences).
238. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227, at vii; see also Q3 2010 DATA, supra note
237, at tbls.1 & 2 (providing statistics for sentences relative to the Guidelines range
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Further, the government cannot reasonably, and does not after
Booker, oppose all motions for a below-Guidelines sentence, argue
for Guidelines sentences, or blindly defend the Guidelines range in
all cases. Prosecutorial discretion has also returned to federal
sentencing, and a renewed role for binding plea agreements is
239
consistent with the trend.
V.

RENEWED ROLE FOR BINDING PLEA AGREEMENTS

A sentencing scheme, particularly one reliant on judicial
discretion, must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate, and
contract for what he believes is a consistent and predictable sentence
240
in his or her case.
This article argues that, in addition to restored
judicial discretion and lower sentences, the pendulum also must
swing toward predictability and informed decision making for
defendants. Following Booker, the government and the defendant
must be permitted to negotiate binding plea agreements in some
circumstances.
District court judges should be more open to binding plea
agreements. Although it is too early to tell, the opposite result is
more likely. This generation of district court judges, after almost
twenty years of the mandatory Guidelines, may disfavor anything
241
that minimizes their role at sentencing.
Prosecutors, too, will
by circuit and district and by each primary offense). These reports indicate a
trend toward more government-sponsored motions for lower sentences other than
its predominant substantial assistance motion.
239. See BOOKER REPORT, supra note 227; see also Q3 2010 DATA, supra note 237,
at tbls.1 & 2 (providing statistics for sentences relative to the Guidelines range by
circuit and district, and by each primary offense). Defense attorneys and district
courts today argue both for traditional grounds of departure under the Guidelines
and for lower sentences based upon downward variances from the Guidelines
range. Although difficult to glean from Commission reports, the government
does not, and cannot, oppose all motions, arguments, and judicial findings for
below-Guidelines sentences.
240. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C); see also supra Part V (discussing a renewed
role for binding plea agreements post-Booker).
241. See supra note 143 (discussing how district court judges may continue to
disfavor binding plea agreements after the Supreme Court restored their
discretion in Booker); supra Part IV.C (discussing the limited judicial role in a “plea
and sentence” federal system).
After almost twenty years of having the
Commission severely limit its discretion at sentencing, district courts will likely not
embrace a mechanism that similarly impacts the court’s discretion to impose its
sentence. Other courts did not favor binding plea agreements during the
mandatory Guidelines, and will be less inclined to accept a “specific sentence”
today. See, e.g., United States v Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156, 158 (D. Wis. 1980) (“At
the outset, the Court would note that it never will accept a . . . [binding] plea
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likely not embrace binding plea agreements without significant
changes to the rules, perceptions, and stigma today associated with
them. Even if inclined, the Commission has not amended the
Guidelines’ treatment of binding plea agreements following Booker.
A. The Guise of Continued Uniformity Post-Booker
The Commission’s post-Booker data collection analysis purports
that its two central policy considerations of uniformity and
242
proportionality continue to be served. There are several reasons
243
that uniformity and proportionality will not endure.
First, the judges imposing sentences in the four years following
Booker were primarily the same judges appointed and presiding
during the mandatory Guidelines era. Whether mandatory or
advisory, some of these judges will default to what they know best:
exercising their discretion within a relatively narrow window.
Second, some judges earnestly continue to sentence according to
the Guidelines to promote uniformity between similarly situated
defendants sentenced today and before 2005. As new judges are
appointed and memories of mandatory Guidelines fade, there is
likely to be less uniformity and proportionality.
Restoring the trial courts’ discretion to determine appropriate
sentences based upon individuals, as opposed to calculations, and
244
to lower sentences were progressive developments.
The
individual defendant’s perception of sentencing, however, has not
agreement. It is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of sentence that
should be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or she has been
adjudged guilty.”).
242. See supra note 230 (discussing the Commission’s attempt to convey
consistent post-Booker results); see also Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity,
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249–50 (2005).
243. See supra note 229 (demonstrating that the statistics show courts have
strayed further away from the Guidelines in the five years following Booker); see also
Jefferson Exum, supra note 23, at 117 (“[T]he tension between procedural
reasonableness based on consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines and
substantive reasonableness that allows district judges to disregard the Guidelines
for policy errors suggests that the best path toward achieving the balance between
sentencing uniformity and sentencing discretion endorsed in Booker is to rethink
the role of the Sentencing Guidelines.”).
244. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the “post-Booker effect” in terms of
returned judicial discretion, lower and more individualized sentences for
defendants, and liberated prosecutors). The court’s restored discretion, relative
to pre-Guidelines judicial discretion, is more uniform, proportional, and reasoned
due to the procedural and substantive requirements imposed by the Court in
Booker. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 223 (2005).
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gone unaffected. When the mandatory Guidelines were applied,
the defendant and his counsel could reasonably predict the post245
plea outcome and make informed decisions.
Post-Booker, the
structured process again depends as much upon the judge as it
246
does upon sentencing considerations.
B. The Potential Impact of Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker
Now that the Guidelines are rendered “advisory,” the parties
must be encouraged and empowered to negotiate and contract for
247
a “specific sentence or sentencing ranges” in appropriate cases.
There are reasons that a prosecutor may want to enter into a
binding plea agreement in some cases. This article focuses on the
defendant’s motivation post-Booker. With a less predictable result,
some defendants under the advisory Guidelines may be motivated
248
by a negotiated result that they were involved in reaching.
Putting motivation aside, the government and the defendant
must be permitted to negotiate the plea agreement’s most
249
important term without significant limitation. The government and
the defendant, like a sentencing court, can consider federal
sentencing policy, the Guidelines, and other factors. As proposed
in Part VI, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the
Guidelines should permit (and encourage) the parties to undergo
the same process in reaching an agreed-upon sentence in a binding
plea agreement, as the court does in imposing a sentence. The
parties’ consideration of the same factors may yield more
consistent, predictable, and personally satisfying results.

245. See generally U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 1, § 2 (outlining
Guidelines provisions relative to hundreds of different offenses and offense
conduct characteristics).
246. See supra Part I (comparing the predictability and information available
in a Guidelines conversation and post-Booker conversation).
247. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
248. The defendant’s motivation during the mandatory Guidelines would
have been exclusively to negotiate a lower sentence than called for under the
mandatory Guidelines. Post-Booker, the defendant’s motivations have become
more complex. For example, in modern federal sentencing, the defendant’s
desire to negotiate for a “specific sentence” in a binding plea agreement may be
hedging against an unpredictable judge or a desire for an early resolution of the
sentence, as well as the guilt phase.
249. Compare supra Part V (discussing a renewed role for binding plea
agreements), with supra Part III.B (discussing how the Guidelines, Section 6B1.2,
and its commentary, rendered binding plea agreements meaningless, and
marginalized their use for more than twenty years).
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The court’s standard for acceptance of the binding plea
agreement could reflect the appellate court’s review of judicially
250
imposed sentences.
The district court’s acceptance of a binding
plea agreement could have both the procedural and substantive
251
First, the district court could review
component of the review.
whether the parties in the plea agreement navigated through the
252
same procedural hoops required of it. Second, the district court
could evaluate the “specific sentence or sentencing range” in the
253
plea agreement for “reasonableness.”
Because a binding plea
agreement accepted by the court typically involves no appeal, this
new standard for acceptance would reinforce sentencing
uniformity and sentences reviewed for reasonableness.
C. Binding Plea Agreements in Enron Prosecution of the NatWest 3
In 2006, one of the first-filed Enron cases, involving three
British bankers who worked for NatWest and were accused of fraud,
254
The “NatWest 3,” as the media
was approaching its trial date.
dubbed them, proceeded to trial late due to a hotly contested and
high-level extradition battle to bring the bankers to the United
States to face the charges related to their dealings with Enron
255
executives.
In England, the media and other outlets vilified the
United States for its pursuit of the NatWest 3, who maintained both
their innocence and their belief that the crimes alleged were not
256
indictable offenses in their home country. For these reasons, and
due to the growing attention to Enron in general, the prosecution
and a successful result were of great importance to the DOJ.
250. See supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s formulation of
“reasonableness” review and its procedural and substantive components
established in Gall, Rita, and Kimbrough).
251. See id.
252. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005) (establishing the
procedural framework of consideration framing the trial court’s post-Booker
discretion).
253. Id. at 262–68 (implementing “reasonableness” as the appellate standard
of review).
254. Simon Freeman, Enron Three Lose Test Case Against Extradition to U.S., TIMES
(London),
Feb.
21,
2006,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk
/article733156.ece (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); NatWest Three: The U.S. Indictment,
BBC NEWS, July 12, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5174358.stm (last
visited Feb. 18, 2011).
255. See Freeman, supra note 254.
256. Steve Boggan, We Want British Justice, Not a US Witchhunt, TIMES (London),
Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/article509608.ece
?token=null&offset=0&page=1.

2011]

THE PENDULUM IN FEDERAL SENTENCING

519

As to the three defendants, the matter was resolved by binding
257
From the defendants’ perspective, they ran a
plea agreements.
litigation risk of conviction at trial and the prospect of a higher
sentence. They also negotiated a specific sentence when the
judge’s sentence following guilty pleas was more unpredictable. Of
Judge Gleeson’s prosecutorial motivations for entering into a
binding plea agreement, many were present in the NatWest 3
258
prosecution.
If the case had proceeded to trial and the
defendants were convicted, many in Great Britain and in the
international media would have considered the prosecution unfair,
politically motivated, and potentially motivating for other countries
to use as fodder for retribution in dealing with U.S. citizens
accused of crimes abroad.
The admissions at their respective guilty pleas, taken as part
of a binding plea agreement, quieted the impending storm. The
term of imprisonment imposed may have represented “justifiable
reasons” under the Guidelines Section 6B1.2, or an unjustified,
discounted plea. In the end, the specific sentence proved far less
259
important than reaching an agreement.
The case should
exemplify the importance and potential impact of binding plea
agreements post-Booker.
D. The Downside to Binding Plea Agreements
It is important to note that binding plea agreements are not
appropriate in all, or even most, federal cases. While this article
generally proposes an increased use of binding plea agreements, in
the majority of federal criminal cases the government will not want
to explore a negotiated sentence. In many serious federal cases,
257. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bermingham, No. 02CR00597, 2007
WL 4983408 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 28, 2007); cf. Moohr, supra note 104, at 941–42
(praising the Guidelines’ uniform and unbiased treatment of white collar crime
cases).
258. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 640. Specifically, there were definite trial risks
that the jury would not understand the evidence or the legal theory of the case
and, more generally, of an acquittal. Also present were considerations that the
result was “fair in the circumstances,” which included a lengthy pretrial stay in the
United States and a significant post-indictment delay due to the extradition issues.
Maybe even, as Judge Gleeson describes, “the milk of human kindness” factored
into the agreement. Id.
259. Pursuant to the plea agreements in United States v. Bermingham, each
containing substantially the same terms, the defendant and the government
agreed to a “specific sentence” of thirty-seven months imprisonment. Plea
Agreement, Bermingham, 2007 WL 498430, at *38.
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the government still will argue for a significant sentence to be
imposed by the court. Negotiating an appropriate resolution has
not been part of the federal prosecutor’s duties in more than
twenty years. Like the judiciary, adapting to a renewed role for
binding plea agreements after the Guidelines’ era will not come
easily.
The binding plea agreement must be beneficial to the
government, as well as the defendant. There are still some cases
where a federal felony conviction and a sentence are more
important than a sentence of a specific duration or a Guidelines
sentence. So long as the defendant appreciates the potential risk
in the post-Booker binding plea agreement, the tool could prove
worthwhile in some cases.
The binding plea agreement, even in the appropriate case, has
potential downsides for the defendant.
First, binding plea
agreements come with the inherent contractual risks of bargaining
260
for a specific sentence.
The defendant may have sought a
“specific sentence or sentencing range” in a binding plea
agreement in an effort to avoid the sentence to be imposed by the
court or for his own piece of mind in having negotiated a known
261
result.
But the risk is the bargained-for result could be greater
than the sentence that the court now would have imposed postBooker.
Second, the binding agreement, once accepted by the court,
262
is final and will not be subject to typical challenges on appeal.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that the word “binding” in the plea agreement context keeps its ordinary
meaning under contract principles); see also Cicchini, supra note 18, at 173. (“Every
plea bargain contains one or more promises and contemplates exchange between
the government and the defendant either immediately, in the future, or both.”).
261. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). A negotiated sentence under Rule
11(c)(1)(C) in the post-Booker era will likely call for a “specific sentence or
sentencing range” below the Guidelines.
262. Since binding plea agreements were introduced into federal criminal
practice in the 1970s, courts have held that a defendant who explicitly and
voluntarily exposes himself to a specific sentence may not challenge that
punishment on appeal. United States v. Green, 595 F.3d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 2010)
(holding that the defendant was bound by his Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement,
despite the subsequent change to the Guidelines related to crack cocaine and §
3782’s function to lower sentences based upon subsequent changes to the
Guidelines); see United States v. Pratt, 657 F.2d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1981); see also
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B), (e) (stating that a defendant must demonstrate a
reason for requesting withdrawal of plea); United States v. Pagan-Ortega, 372 F.3d
22, 28 (1st Cir. 2004) (regret is not an acceptable grounds to withdraw a plea;
defendant must prove an unfair and unjust result to withdraw binding
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Thus, the positives of owning contractual responsibilities can also
263
Contract principles dictate that either party
be the negatives.
may rescind the plea agreement before the court’s acceptance of
264
the agreement, yet, once accepted, the contact is formed and
265
Further, parties will likely memorialize
mutually enforceable.
agreed-upon sentences pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) in a plea
266
agreement accompanied by an appellate waiver or, at the very
least, the determinative sentence will be presumptively
267
reasonable.
In addition, the specific sentence in a binding plea
agreement will not qualify for a sentence modification under §
3582(c), which allows for a sentence to be adjusted if the
268
Sentencing Commission lowers relevant Guidelines.
Nor will it
be adjusted for other post-sentencing “corrections” under Rule
269
35(b). Once agreed to and accepted with the sentence imposed,
11(c)(1)(C) agreement). See generally MOORE ET AL., supra note 113, § 611.02 n.11.
263. Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 282 (holding that a binding plea agreement could
not be undone by the discretionary possibility of a different sentence under the
Guidelines).
264. The general rule, however, is subject to a detrimental reliance exception.
Even if the agreement has not been finalized by the court, “[a] defendant’s
detrimental reliance on a prosecutorial promise in plea bargaining could make a
plea agreement binding.” McKenzie v. Risley, 801 F.2d 1519, 1527 (9th Cir. 1986),
vacated in part on other grounds, 842 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1988).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986)
(finding that when determining whether disputed plea agreements have been
formed or conditions performed, courts have drawn the formation and
interpretation of commercial contracts); see generally Peter Westen & David Westin,
A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471 (1978)
(analyzing criminal plea agreements in terms of contractual scenarios).
266. Every circuit has held that some forms of appeal waivers are permissible
in a plea agreement. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889–92 (8th Cir.
2003); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Jemison, 237
F.3d 911, 916–18 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 559–63
(3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21–27 (1st Cir. 2001); United
States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402–06 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nguyen,
235 F.3d 1179, 1182–84 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rubio, 231 F.3d 709, 71113 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (11th Cir.
1999); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir. 1992).
267. United States v. Welker, No. 09-3409, 2010 WL 2542966, at *1 (8th Cir.
June 25, 2010) (opining that “Welker received the very sentence he agreed to in
his plea agreement”).
268. See Sanchez, 562 F.3d at 280–81 (citing United States v. Cieslowski, 410
F.3d 353, 364 (7th Cir. 2005)).
269. United States v. Semler, 883 F.2d 832, 833–34 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that Rule 11(e)(3) forbids a lenient departure, even based on Rule 35(b), which
permits courts to correct illegal sentences, when the sentence was agreed to under
an 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement).
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270

the agreement will be enforced.
Third, a binding plea agreement is subject to some of the
same limitations as any other plea agreement in federal court. For
instance, the agreement will not bind separate sovereigns, such as
state prosecution offices, that may prosecute a defendant for the
271
similar conduct.
Whether binding or not, a plea agreement is a
contract between a defendant and the specific prosecutor’s office
signing the agreement, and the agreement must be supported in
272
the facts.
Further, the court must determine that there is a
factual basis for the plea, as there are no “legal fictions” in federal
273
plea bargaining.

270. See United States v. Bernard, 373 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
United States v. Fritsch, 891 F.2d 667, 668 (8th Cir. 1989) (“This court has held
that a defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself to a specific
sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal.” (citing United States v.
Pratt, 657 F.2d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1981))).
271. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a
United States Attorney negotiates and contracts on behalf of ‘the United States’ or
‘the Government’ in a plea agreement for specific crimes, that attorney speaks for
and binds all of his or her fellow United States Attorneys with respect to those
same crimes and those same defendants.”); United States v. Johnston, 199 F.3d
1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that while ambiguities in plea agreement must
be construed against the government, where language is clear in binding only a
particular district, another district is not bound by the agreement); United States
v. Annabi, 771 F.2d 670, 672 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that “[a] plea agreement
binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the
plea is entered unless it affirmatively appears that the agreement contemplates a
broader restriction”). But see United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir.
1986) (construing ambiguity in plea agreement against the Government and thus
holding the agreement was binding on another federal district); Elaine K. Zipp,
Annotation, When is Federal Prosecutor Bound by Promises of Immunity or Plea Bargains
Made by Another Federal Agent, 55 A.L.R. FED. 402 (1981).
272. See Ashcroft July 2003 Memo, supra note 86, at 2–3 (admonishing federal
prosecutors from “fact bargaining” or otherwise keeping information from
probation and the court); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)
(a plea agreement negotiated by one prosecutor is binding upon all other
prosecutors on the same staff); see also DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, C. PETER ERLINDER &
DAVID C. THOMAS, Pleas and Plea Bargaining, in CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
12.06(11)(e) (2009) (explaining the court’s reasoning and holding in Santobello).
273. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (1966
amendments) (“The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the
attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report, or
otherwise, that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense
charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which
the defendant has pleaded guilty.”). Some district courts read the judicial duty—
to ensure there is a “factual basis for the plea”—to mean factual support for a term
of the plea agreement, such as the “specific sentence” in a binding plea
agreement. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
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These risks and requirements of binding plea agreements must
be considered. And a binding plea agreement will not be
appropriate in most federal prosecutions. This article’s proposed
renewed role for binding plea agreements, and the substantive
proposals that follow, advocate for the opportunity for the
government and the individual defendant to negotiate and
contract for appropriate sentences in some cases.
VI.

PROPOSED CHANGES TO EMBRACE BINDING PLEA
AGREEMENTS

This article proposes that Congress should enact a new
standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea agreements postBooker. Congress should empower criminal defendants and federal
prosecutors in some cases to negotiate and contract for a sentence
they perceive is uniform, proportional, and just. Binding plea
agreements are not appropriate in most cases, yet the parties must
be permitted to enter into agreements for a specific sentence that
is “reasonable” and consistent with Congress’s original intent
274
underlying Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
Instead, the Guidelines’ outdated
standard continues to marginalize this potentially valuable tool.
The Guidelines’ policy statement and commentary related to
275
accepting binding plea agreements is inapplicable after Booker.
Trial courts are imposing below-Guideline sentences in more than
276
forty percent of cases.
No criminal defendant today would
negotiate for a Guidelines sentence when statistics show it to be the
277
worst-case scenario.
The current standard demands that the
court reject a binding plea agreement in some circumstances when
the court would have imposed a similar sentence without the
binding agreement. This must change.

274. United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that
Rule 11 “specifically provide[d] for possible concessions that the government may
make in a plea agreement . . .”) (emphasis added).
275. See Q2 2010 DATA, supra note 227 (discussing that district courts
increasingly are imposing sentences below the Guidelines, almost forty percent,
according to the Commission’s last quarterly report, and the amount of the
variance from the Guidelines is similarly increasing).
276. Q3 2010 DATA, supra note 237, at tbls.1 & 2 (showing that between
October 1, 2009, and June 30, 2010, 43.4% of sentences were below the Guidelines
range).
277. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the statistical benefit to the defendant
post-Booker).
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Further, it has been almost twenty years since binding plea
agreements served an important role in federal criminal practice.
As a result, most district judges and prosecutors are likely not
278
familiar with binding plea agreements.
District courts still
evaluate the merits of the specific sentence called for in a binding
279
plea agreement.
The standard must shift from a less qualitative
evaluation of the sentence to a standard similar to the appellate
review of imposed sentences, the deferential standard of
reasonableness.
Lastly, the prosecutorial stigma and mystery of binding plea
agreements also lessen the likelihood of its renewed role. The
stigma associated with binding plea agreements derives from the
sub rosa and underground deals struck during the mandatory
Guidelines era. The mystery involves seeking judicial acceptance of
a deal with a judge who is prohibited by statute from having a role
in plea negotiations. This article proposes changes to Rule 11, the
Guidelines’ policy statements, new DOJ protocol, a proposed local
rule, and more palpable plea agreement language.
A. Proposed Revisions to Rule 11
The standard for judicial acceptance of a binding plea
agreement must change. Congress should enact an amendment to
Rule 11 that introduces a new standard. The new standard, like the
appellate court’s reasonableness review of judicially imposed
280
sentences, should have a procedural and substantive component.
278. The Guidelines were implemented in 1987 and marginalized the role of
binding plea agreements through a policy statement and commentary. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 3, §§ 6B1.2(c), 6B1.2 cmt. (defining the standard
for judicial acceptance of a binding plea agreement).
279. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (describing the court’s discretion to
accept or reject a binding plea agreement).
280. See supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s test of
“reasonableness” as having a procedural and substantive component); Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining court’s review of judicially
imposed sentences must include procedural and substantive considerations); see
also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonableness
review involves both procedural and substantive components.”); United States v.
Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[R]easonableness depends not only
on the length of the sentence but on the process by which it is imposed.”).
It is important to note that a district court’s imposed sentence may be
challenged as unreasonable by the defendant for being too high or by the
government for being too low. See United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 906–07
(10th Cir. 2006) (in which the defendant challenged his sentence as unreasonable
because it was higher than the recommended sentencing range). In this article’s
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Procedurally, the district court should review the binding plea
agreement to ensure that the parties engaged in the same process,
ran the same calculations, and considered the same factors that the
281
district court would consider at sentencing.
Substantively, the
district court should review the specific sentence or sentencing
range in the agreement with an abuse of discretion type of
282
standard.
The Court has noted in cases since Booker that the reviewing
court should defer to the district court as the entity with the
greatest familiarity with the case; applying that same analysis, the
parties to a binding plea agreement have an even greater familiarity
283
with the facts than the district court.
If the government and the
defendant navigate the same process and agree upon a reasonable
sentence, then the new standard should require the court to accept
the agreement. The district judge that disagrees with, values
differently, or otherwise dislikes the sentence imposed must defer
to the contracting parties. The amendment to Rule 11 could read
proposal to have district court judges review the sentence in a binding plea
agreement for reasonableness, the court need only access the inevitable downward
variance of a binding plea agreement. See id. at 907 (“[T]he extremity of the
variance between the actual sentence imposed and the applicable Guidelines
range should determine the amount of scrutiny we give to the district court’s
substantive sentence.”).
281. For example, under the New Jersey state sentencing scheme, a state judge
must accept a plea agreement unless the specific sentence in the agreement
“contravenes the sentencing criteria of the code” or the record demonstrates
prosecutorial abuse of discretion. See State v. Bilse, 581 A.2d 518, 523 (N.J. 1990).
282. Parties should reflect their considerations of the proper sentencing
factors in the plea agreement, whereas the court must place the same
considerations on the record. See United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 170
n.5 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[C]laims of noncompliance with rule 11 must be resolved
solely on the basis of the rule 11 transcript. That transcript provides all that is
needed and all that is allowed for the resolution of such claims.”).
A counterargument against allowing the government and a defendant to
contract for a specific sentence so long as they consider the same factors is abuse
and disparate treatment. The enhanced prosecutorial discretion, the discretion to
grant binding agreements, and the extent of the benefit, may be ripe for abuse
and unbalanced application. Yet, many federal prosecution offices have an
approved hierarchy and internal policies reflecting their declination/prosecution
standards. Similarly, these prosecution shops have committees and standards for
granting downward departures and approving the amount of the departure
recommended to the court. Binding plea agreements could be handled in the
same way. Prosecution offices could establish internal standards, committees, and
hierarchical approval for granting and valuing binding plea agreements.
283. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (holding that the trial judge
has “greater familiarity with . . . the individual case and the individual defendant
before him . . .” (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007))).
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as follows (new language in bold):
Federal
Rules
of
Criminal
Procedure,
IV.
ARRAIGNMENT AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL , Rule
11. Pleas * * * (c) Plea Agreement Procedure. * * * (3)
Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.
(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type
specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may
accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until
the court has reviewed the presentence report.
***
(C) The court shall review any written plea agreement
entered into pursuant to subsection Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
The agreement must demonstrate that the parties in
reaching the specific sentence or sentencing range in the
agreement considered the same factors and policy
284
statements that the court would consider at sentencing.
If the parties did so and the specific sentence or
sentencing range is reasonable, then the court shall accept
the agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) and impose
sentence accordingly.
Such a standard encourages the parties to negotiate binding
plea agreements in some cases and removes the stigma associated
with binding plea agreements. Finally, this new standard takes the
mystery out of bringing a binding plea agreement before a judge
who may reject the agreement based upon reasons not known to
the parties. An act of Congress in amending Rule 11 is not the only
way to enact a new standard for judicial acceptance of plea
agreements; the Commission could also change the Guideline
policy statements after Booker.

284. Today, the agreement must reflect that the parties (i) calculated the
applicable sentencing range under the applicable edition of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines; (ii) considered the applicable range; and (iii) considered
the factors set forth in § 3553(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M) (The defendant
must understand the process “in determining a sentence, the court’s obligation to
calculate the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range,
possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) . . . .”).
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B. Proposed Amendment to the Applicable Guidelines’ Policy
Statements
Alternatively, but less likely, the Commission could introduce
the new standard for judicial acceptance of binding plea
agreements. It was, after all, the Guidelines that ushered binding
plea agreements out of federal criminal practice more than twenty
285
years ago.
The policy statement, however, could be redrafted to
reflect the district court’s procedural and substantive review of a
286
The inapplicable
binding plea agreement as set out above.
standard reflected in Guidelines policy carries no practical effect
287
following Booker.
The Guidelines should restore the parties’
“power to enter into sentence bargains pursuant to Rule
288
11(c)(1)(C)” as Congress intended.
C. DOJ Protocol and Attorney General Memoranda
Changing Rule 11 and the Guidelines would provide the
government and defendant with the opportunity to enter into the
type of binding plea agreements that Congress intended when it
289
There must also be a
authorized their use under Rule 11.
perception change related to binding plea agreements post-Booker.
285. See supra Parts III.A and B (arguing that the mandatory Guidelines
effectively replaced binding agreements and, through Guidelines’ policy
statements, rendered these agreements meaningless for more than twenty years).
286. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that the
court’s review of judicially imposed sentences must include procedural and
substantive considerations); see also United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 434
(4th Cir. 2006) (“Reasonableness review involves both procedural and substantive
components.”); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“[R]easonableness depends not only on the length of the sentence but on the
process by which it is imposed.”); supra note 222 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
test of “reasonableness” as having a procedural and substantive component).
Practically, the district court has the benefit of a U.S. Probation’s presentence report (PSR), which includes the Guidelines calculation and the postBooker starting point for sentencing. The parties to a binding plea agreement do
not yet have the PSR or a fully developed calculation and applicable guideline
range. With the rule change and process proposed in this article, mirroring the
sentencing court’s process is essential. Perhaps parties considering a binding plea
agreement could request a draft PSR from U.S. Probation that reflects the
calculation portions of the PSR only.
287. Gleeson, supra note 22, at 660.
288. Id. at 639, 660–61.
289. As previously discussed in Part III.A, Congress encouraged parties in
criminal cases to negotiate and agree, subject to court approval, “that a specific
sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.” FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C).
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Binding plea agreements in federal court went from an essential
part of federal criminal practice to prosecutorial taboo during the
290
mandatory Guidelines era.
This perception change would best
come from a change to DOJ protocol and a more definitive
statement about binding plea agreements from the Attorney
General.
The memoranda from the DOJ during the mandatory
Guidelines era limited prosecutorial discretion and discouraged
binding plea agreements. The Justice Department under President
Barack Obama could reinvigorate the binding plea agreement,
encourage its use in federal criminal practice, and remove the
prosecutorial stigma associated with the practice. First, the DOJ
could release a new policy statement in Section 9-16.000 of the U.S.
Attorney’s Manual, entitled “Pleas—Federal Rule of Criminal
291
Procedure 11.” Second, DOJ could incorporate by reference and
release guidance in a section, or expansion of an existing section,
292
Third, and most
its corresponding Criminal Resource Manual.
important, the Attorney General should author a memorandum
designed to encourage binding plea agreements in appropriate
293
cases.
On May 10, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder released a
memorandum entitled “Department Policy on Charging and
Sentencing” that addressed prosecutorial discretion and DOJ
protocol for, among other things, entering into plea agreements
294
and sentencing. This Attorney General memorandum states:
In the typical case, the appropriate balance among these
purposes will continue to be reflected by the applicable
guidelines range, and prosecutors should generally

290. See id. (discussing the negative effect of the mandatory Guidelines era
and emphasizing the value of sentence bargaining).
291. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 623 (1997),
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9
/crm00000.htm.
292. See id. (reciting the federal criminal rules governing pleas, including
binding plea agreements in a section called “Pleas—Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11,” but remaining silent to the practice of entering into such
agreements).
293. The Attorney General memorandum could empower local prosecution
offices to establish supervisory and committee review of such decisions in the same
fashion these offices have long valued sentencing recommendations in motions
for downward departure based upon substantial assistance.
294. Holder 2010 Memo, supra note 90.
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continue to advocate for a sentence within that range.
The advisory guidelines remain important in furthering
the goal of national uniformity throughout the federal
system. But consistent with the Principles of Federal
Prosecution and given the advisory nature of the
guidelines, advocacy at sentencing—like charging
decisions and plea agreements—must also follow from an
individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances
of each particular case. All prosecutorial requests for
departures or variances . . . must be based upon specific
and articulable factors, and require supervisory
295
approval.
An amendment to Rule 11, as proposed above, could
complement this recent expression of a federal prosecutor’s
obligations during plea negotiations and at sentencing. A new
Attorney General memo could establish, or encourage components
of the DOJ and U.S. Attorney’s Offices to establish, the following
policies and practices:
(1) explore binding plea agreements in appropriate
criminal cases that may reasonably be resolved by guilty
plea;
(2) educate the local federal judiciary about the merits of
binding plea agreements in some cases in terms of contract
rights, efficiency, and the interests of justice;
(3) establish internal guidance about approval
procedures, binding plea agreement committees, typical
cases appropriate for negotiated resolution and valuation
of sentencing considerations, specific sentences, and plea
agreement provisions; and
(4) promote sound contractual principles in plea
bargaining and the notions of predictability and informed
decision making for the defendant at sentencing.
D. Proposed Local Rule
The proposals outlined above should also be accompanied by
a local rule. Local rules are typically drafted by the judiciary and
296
Assuming these groups also
reviewed by the relevant offices.
295.
296.

Id. at 2–3.
For a local rule of criminal practice, as proposed here, the U.S. Attorney’s
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favor increased predictability and informed decision making for
the defendant, as well as enhanced prosecutorial ability to enter
into binding plea agreements, the proposed rule may read as
follows:
Proposed Local Rule [#]
(A) In a criminal case involving the adjudication of a
felony offense, the district court shall follow a three-step
process before imposing sentence and on the record.
First, it must make findings as to the applicable U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions and applicable
Guidelines’ range. Second, the court must decide any
motions departure or variance filed by either party.
Third, the court must consider and weigh the factors to be
considered in § 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code.
The court shall then impose a reasonable sentence
supported by the process and considerations above and in
the interests of justice.
(B) Parties to a criminal case in this district are
encouraged to explore, negotiate and contract for a
“specific sentence or sentencing range” in a binding plea
agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11(c)(1)(C).
Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), the government and a defendant
may contract for a “specific sentence or sentencing range”
that is binding on the court, so long as it is in writing,
reflects the process that the court would follow and the
factors the court would consider at sentencing, as set
forth in subsection (A).
(C) The district court shall accept a binding plea
agreement if the agreement complies with subsection (B),
reflects the process described in subsection (A), and the
imposed sentence is reasonable.

Office, Office of the Federal Defender, Chief Judge of the district or other
delegates, local chapter of the Federal Bar Association, and any other local
criminal defense organization or informal leaders in the federal criminal bar for
the district should review any proposed local rule.
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E. Proposed Plea Agreement Language
Assuming a new standard for accepting binding plea
agreements is established and a necessary perception change
occurs, the parties to a binding plea agreement must do their part.
The prosecution and the defense must demonstrate that the
binding plea reflects the same process that the court would
undergo at sentencing. The parties must memorialize the postBooker considerations and discuss the factors that support the
specific sentence or sentencing range featured in the binding plea
agreement.
Like the transcript of the district court’s sentencing
proceeding for appellate review, the binding plea agreement must
satisfy the reviewer that the proper process was followed.
Specifically, the parties must actually calculate and consider the
applicable Guidelines range, viable grounds for departure, §
3553(a) factors, and memorialize these considerations in the plea
297
agreement.
The agreement must reflect a logical pathway from
the considerations to the specific sentence.
The parties should consider selecting a sentencing range
298
under Rule 11(c)(1)(C). The majority of district court judges, as
well as federal prosecutors, have only known the mandatory
Guidelines and its ranges. A binding plea agreement to a
“sentencing range” has several advantages: the district court
maintains its most familiar sentencing function, the range can span
a gap in plea negotiations, and the district court, after imposing a
sentence within a prescribed range, is more likely to find the
sentence reasonable on review.

297. The location of the above recitation of considerations is not important. It
could be in a plea agreement, a statement of reasons incorporated by reference,
or, if the reasoning need not be in the record, then in a joint letter to the court.
298. See United States v. Silva, 413 F.3d 1283, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 2005)
(defendant stipulated in 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement to a particular sentencing
range, rather than a specific sentence); United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380,
1386-87 (9th Cir. 1986) (pre-Guidelines case where the parties agreed to a
sentencing range of no more than three years and the court imposed eighteen
months); United States v. Burruezo, 704 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1983) (preGuidelines case setting forth the agreement that “any prison sentences imposed
on [the] pleas of guilty shall not exceed ten years”); United States v. Howard, No.
H-03-93, 2009 WL 1683798, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2009) (another Enron
prosecution resolved by binding plea agreement, but to a “sentencing range” of
four to twelve months of home confinement and/or probation).
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Lastly, the parties should place information on the record not
typically before the court in a pre-sentence report. For instance,
the government could articulate generally in a binding plea
agreement that the specific sentence is partly based on a risk at
trial, victim considerations, or due to concerns of efficiency and use
of resources. This type of information contributes to the court’s
understanding of why the determinative sentence is “reasonable” in
the case before it.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In addition to increased judicial discretion and overall lower
sentences, the pendulum also can swing toward predictability and
informed decision making for the defendant. The new process in
federal sentencing must allow a defendant to pursue, negotiate,
and contract for what the defendant believes is a uniform,
proportional, and fair sentence. A renewed role for binding plea
agreements in federal court could complement the progressive
developments following Booker and restore some predictability and
informed decision making for the individual defendant.

